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OPIOID POLICING
BARBARA FEDDERS*
This Article identifies and explores a new, local law enforcement approach to alleged
drug offenders. Initially limited to a few police departments, but now expanding
rapidly across the country, this innovation takes one of two primary forms. The first
is a diversion program through which officers refer alleged offenders to communitybased social services rather than initiate criminal proceedings. The second form
offers legal amnesty as well as priority access to drug detoxification programs to
users who voluntarily relinquish illicit drugs. Because the upsurge in addiction to
—and death from—opioids has spurred this innovation, I refer to it as “opioid
policing.”
This new approach improves in key ways upon previous state responses to illicit
drug use. Opioid policing has explicit public-health aims—seeking improved life
outcomes for people addicted to drugs without relying on arrest. By contrast, the
War on Drugs incentivized arrests, which create myriad negative consequences for
drug-law offenders—with few discernible offsetting social gains. Opioid policing
also avoids the most problematic aspects of specialized drug courts. Scholars and
reformers have documented how these courts provide substandard treatment and
employ procedures that frequently lead to more, rather than less, entanglement with
the criminal system. Unlike the drug court, opioid policing operates at the prebooking phase, rather than after legal proceedings have already begun, allowing
drug users to avoid the harms of criminal processing entirely.
Notwithstanding its salutary features, opioid policing retains key troubling
characteristics of both War on Drugs policing and drug courts. The structure of
opioid policing programs creates incentives for law enforcement to expand, rather
than reduce, surveillance of marginalized populations. What is more, opioid policing
may re-entrench rather than disrupt the distributive inequities of race and class that
permeate previous state responses to illicit drug use. Ultimately, the assessment this
Article undertakes reveals both the limitations of drug-reform efforts situated within
law enforcement as well as the reach and the power of the contemporary carceral
state.

*. Assistant Professor, UNC School of Law. Tamar Birckhead, Maxine Eichner, Kate
Elengold, Caitlin Fenhagen, Carissa Hessick, Melissa Jacoby, Eisha Jain, Tom Kelley, Alex
Kreit, Jason Langberg, Holning Lau, Anna Roberts, Kathryn Sabbeth, Mark Weidemaier,
Deborah Weissman, and Erika Wilson provided helpful suggestions, for which I am grateful.
Seth Stoughton was particularly generous in sharing his time and expertise. I presented earlier
versions of this Article at the University of Kentucky College of Law “Developing Ideas”
conference, the UNC School of Law Faculty Speakers Series, the Mid-Atlantic Junior Faculty
Forum, the West Virginia University Law Review Appalachian Justice Symposium, and the
Tulane University Law School Junior Scholars Exchange. Sarah Jamison, Bethanie Maxwell,
Jeff Miles, and Jeff Nooney provided outstanding research assistance.

390

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:389

INTRODUCTION...................................................................................................... 390
I. PREVIOUS STATE RESPONSES: MAPPING THE CRITIQUES ............................... 398
A. WAR ON DRUGS POLICING ................................................................... 398
1. A TOUGH-ON-CRIME, RACIALIZED POLITICS .............................. 398
2. PRIMACY OF ARREST .................................................................. 402
A. INCENTIVES ....................................................................... 402
B. HARMS AND COSTS ........................................................... 404
I.
INDIVIDUAL ............................................................. 405
II. SOCIAL ..................................................................... 408
B. SPECIALIZED DRUG COURTS ................................................................ 410
1. THE PROBLEM WITH COMPULSORY TREATMENT ........................ 412
2. THE PROBLEM OF THE ABSTINENCE IMPERATIVE ........................ 414
3. THE PROBLEM OF AN EXCLUSIVE EMPHASIS ON ADDICTION ...... 416
4. THE VETTING PROBLEM .............................................................. 417
5. ABSENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY .................................................. 419
II. OPIOID POLICING: THEORY AND PRACTICE .................................................... 419
A. OVERVIEW OF THE OPIOID CRISIS......................................................... 420
B. ADDRESSING THE HARMS AND COSTS OF ARREST................................ 423
C. SHAPING POLICE DISCRETION .............................................................. 426
D. NEW PRACTICES ................................................................................... 429
1. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTED DIVERSION ................................. 430
2. LEGAL AMNESTY AND DRUG DETOXIFICATION .......................... 433
III. THE PROMISE OF OPIOID POLICING ................................................................ 434
A. TOWARD A PUBLIC-HEALTH LENS ON DRUG CRIMES .......................... 434
1. AVOIDANCE OF ARREST .............................................................. 434
2. HARM REDUCTION OVER ABSTINENCE ....................................... 435
B. ON-THE-GROUND RESULTS .................................................................. 437
V. THE LIMITATIONS .......................................................................................... 439
A. EXPANSION OF STATE SURVEILLANCE.................................................. 439
B. MORAL SORTING AND BIAS…………………………………………...443
C. DISTRIBUTIVE INEQUITIES .................................................................... 446
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 448

INTRODUCTION
Prescriptions for, addiction to, and death from opioids have risen dramatically in
the past two decades.1 In this period, personal use of opioid painkillers went up nearly

1. See generally Opioids: Brief Description, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids [https://perma.cc/3XNJ-ZEMS] (defining
opioids as a class of drugs that includes pain relievers available legally by prescription, such
as oxycodone, marketed as OxyContin; hydrocodone, marketed as Vicodin; codeine;
morphine; the illegal drug heroin; and synthetic products such as fentanyl and carfentanil).
While medical commentators once differentiated between natural and synthetic forms of the
drug, with “opiate” referring to the former and “opioid” to the latter, that distinction has for
the most part been abandoned. Stephanie Labonville, IWP: The Patient Advocate Pharmacy,
Opiate, Opioid, Narcotic - What’s the Difference? (Mar. 29, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://info
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500%.2 Though regulators have begun to crack down on over-prescription by
doctors,3 illicit opioid use persists; heroin and fentanyl use are both on the rise.4 Over
two million people currently meet the medical criteria for opioid use disorder.5 In
2017, 47,000 people died from opioid-related overdose deaths,6 a number higher than
in the previous year.7 The number of drug overdose-related deaths exceeds American
casualties at the peak of the AIDS crisis. 8

.iwpharmacy.com/opiate-opioid-narcotic-whats-the-difference
[https://perma.cc/2SQY
-XLAA]; see infra notes 132–60 and accompanying text.
2. G. Caleb Alexander, Thomas W. Clark, David T. Courtwright, John L. Eadie,
Catherine S. Hwang, Andrew Kolodny & Peter Kreiner, The Prescription Opioid and Heroin
Crisis: A Public Health Approach to an Epidemic of Addiction, 36 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH
559, 560 (2015).
3. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ANNUAL SURVEILLANCE REPORT
OF DRUG-RELATED RISKS AND OUTCOMES 11, 66 (2017) (noting that prescription rates peaked
in 2010 and have since fallen).
4. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HEROIN OVERDOSE DATA (2017)
(“[H]eroin use has been increasing in recent years among men and women, most age groups,
and all income levels.”). The CDC rejects the causal link that some observers have made
between increased regulation of opioid prescription and increase in use of street drugs. See,
e.g., Gery P. Guy Jr., Kun Zhang, Michele K. Bohm, Jan Losby, Brian Lewis, Randall Young,
Louise B. Murphy & Deborah Dowell, Vital Signs: Changes in Opioid Prescribing in the
United States, 2006–2015, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (2017), https://www
.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6626a4.htm [https://perma.cc/TSL9-B2MY].
5. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., KEY SUBSTANCE USE AND
MENTAL HEALTH INDICATORS IN THE UNITED STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2016 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH 30 (2017) (noting that 2.1 million people met the criteria
for opioid use disorder in 2016).
6. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, OVERDOSE DEATH RATES, https://www.drugabuse
.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates
[https://perma.cc/4MTU-CUUK]
(noting rise in deaths from opioids and indicating that 2017 data are provisional); CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DRUG OVERDOSE DEATH DATA, https://www.cdc
.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/A43S-RLWX] (noting opioids
involved in over 42,000 fatal overdoses); Sheila Kaplan, C.D.C. Reports a Record Jump in
Drug Overdose Deaths Last Year, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017
/11/03/health/deaths-drug-overdose-cdc.html [https://perma.cc/82YP-JQEV] (noting increase
of seventeen percent in drug overdose deaths between 2015 and 2016).
7. Andrew Sullivan, The Poison We Pick, N.Y. MAGAZINE: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Feb.
20, 2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/02/americas-opioid-epidemic.html
[https://perma.cc/YF3D-C35V] (citing data suggesting the total number of 2017 opioid-related
overdose deaths will rise to 52,000).
8. Compare Josh Katz, Drug Deaths in America Are Rising Faster Than Ever, N.Y.
TIMES (June 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/05/upshot/opioid
-epidemic-drug-overdose-deaths-are-rising-faster-than-ever.html
[https://perma.cc/AB6Z
-35AB] (finding 64,000 deaths from drug overdoses in 2016), with David R. Holtgrave,
Causes of the Decline in AIDS Deaths, United States, 1995–2002: Prevention, Treatment or
Both?, 16 INT’L J. STD & AIDS 777, 778, tbl.1 (2005) (noting 51,670 AIDS deaths in the
United States in the peak year of 1995), and Sullivan, supra note 7 (noting Vietnam War
deaths). See also Kaplan, supra note 6 (noting that opioid overdose is now the leading cause
of accidental death for Americans under the age of fifty).
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Federal and state policymakers have begun to push for severe criminal
penalties for people who sell or share opioids, 9 including urging prosecutions under
so-called “drug-induced homicide” statutes.10 Such statutes permit homicide
prosecutions whenever a defendant delivers a controlled substance and someone dies
from ingesting it;11 the only mens rea requirement is that the defendant knew she was
delivering a controlled substance, as opposed to a standard of recklessness or
negligence.12
Notwithstanding this move to crack down on suspected opioid dealers, the
dominant cultural narrative surrounding people who take opioids is sympathetic.13 In
contrast to the negative rhetoric that characterized the crack cocaine crisis—most
prominently the demonization of pregnant women of color who used crack14—and

9. DRUG POL’Y ALL., AN OVERDOSE DEATH IS NOT MURDER: WHY DRUG-INDUCED
HOMICIDE LAWS ARE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND INHUMANE (2017) (“Although data are
unavailable on the number of people being prosecuted under these laws, media mentions of
drug-induced homicide prosecutions have increased substantially over the last six years. In
2011, there were 363 news articles about individuals being charged with or prosecuted for
drug-induced homicide, increasing over 300% to 1,178 in 2016.”). Drug-induced homicide
statutes include, for example: ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(3) (West 2017); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-102(e) (West 2018); FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)(3) (West 2017); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/9-3.3 (West 2018); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1(3) (West 2017); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 750.317a (West 2018); MINN. STAT. § 609.195(b) (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:35-9 (West 2018); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT ANN. § 2506(a) (West 2018); 11 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-23-6 (West 2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(a)(2) (West 2018); VT. STAT.
ANN. TIT. 18, § 4250(a) (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.415 (West 2018); WIS. STAT.
§ 940.02(2)(a) (West 2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (West 2017).
10. At present, a substantial minority of states have drug-induced homicide statutes. See,
e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3.3 (West 2018) (“A person commits drug-induced
homicide when he or she violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or
Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by unlawfully
delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person’s death is caused by the injection,
inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance.”); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:35-9 (West 2018) (“Any person who manufactures, distributes or dispenses
methamphetamine, lysergic acid diethylamide, phencyclidine or any other controlled
dangerous substance classified in Schedules I or II, or any controlled substance analog thereof,
in violation of subsection a. of N.J.S. 2C:35-5, is strictly liable for a death which results from
the injection, inhalation or ingestion of that substance, and is guilty of a crime of the first
degree.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (West 2017) (“A person is guilty of drug induced
homicide if: (i) He is an adult or is at least four (4) years older than the victim; and (ii) He
violates W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(i) or (ii) or (b)(i) or (ii) by unlawfully delivering a controlled
substance to a minor and that minor dies as a result of the injection, inhalation, ingestion or
administration by any other means of any amount of that controlled substance.”).
11. Valena Beety, The Overdose/Homicide Epidemic, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 983, 990
(2018).
12. Eric A. Johnson, Rethinking the Presumption of Mens Rea, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
769, 776 (2012).
13. See Valarie K. Blake, Engaging Health Insurers in the War on Prescription
Painkillers, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 485 (2017).
14. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 7–27
(2011) (discussing how the racialization of the crack epidemic fed a criminal justice response,
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heroin users in the 1950s and 1960s derided as “junkies,”15 today’s opioid discourse
tends to avoid excessively harsh judgment of users. Commentators instead highlight
the genetic component of opioid misuse;16 advocates point to science showing that
addiction is a disease,17 arguing that as a result people who misuse opioids deserve
treatment instead of punishment.18 Elected officials stress the culpability of
pharmaceutical companies for aggressive marketing, and physicians for profligate
prescribing.19 Social scientists link opioid addiction to the high unemployment rate
and personal isolation in areas where it is most widespread. 20 They argue for more

highlighting the political advantages of racializing the crack epidemic, and providing statistics
and data on the effect racialization had in the criminal justice system); Craig Reinarman &
Harry G. Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror: Deconstructing Drug War Mythology, 31
SOC. JUST. 182, 191–94 (2004) (describing hysteria about “crack babies” and noting that the
notion that babies whose mothers used crack cocaine during pregnancy were severely at risk
was misguided); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1481 (1991) (noting racist
media portrayal of pregnant Black women and “crack babies”).
15. Glenn Ellis, The Forgotten Opioid Epidemic: African Americans and Heroin, THE
PHILADELPHIA TRIBUNE (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.phillytrib.com/news/health/the
-forgotten-opioid-epidemic-african-americans-and-heroin/article_7903ffc9-9f8c-5d2c-88a7
-26b36952dc6d.html [https://perma.cc/5U9D-JJHW] (noting that heroin users in 1960s were
punished harshly and arguing that such punishments were seen as socially acceptable because
users were primarily Black and poor).
16. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, In Heroin Crisis, White Families Seek Gentler War on
Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/31/us/heroin-war-on
-drugs-parents.html [https://perma.cc/LCD3-P2VL]; NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH & CASEY
ANDERSON, OPIOIDS: TREATING AN ILLNESS, ENDING A WAR 19 (2017) (“[I]n content and in
visual framing, media coverage of the current opioid crisis portrays it as an outside threat
and focuses on treatment and recovery, while stories of heroin in the 1970s and crackcocaine in the 1980s focused on the drug user’s morality.” (citation omitted)).
17. Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1518 (2004) (noting that the notion of addiction as
disease is controversial but that it does have some support from the medical community).
18. See, e.g., Brief for the Probationer on a Reported Question and on Appeal from a
Finding of Probation Violation from the Concord Division of the District Court Department
at 2, 4, 6, Commonwealth v. Eldred, 101 N.E.3d 911 (Mass. 2018) (arguing that “science now
recognizes that drug addiction . . . is not caused by moral turpitude but rather is a chronic brain
disease whose defining feature is the compulsive use of a substance despite significant
substance-related problems” and that “punishing relapse is clinically contraindicated”
(citations omitted)); America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.people-press.org/2014/04/02/americas-new-drug-policy-landscape
[https://
perma.cc/6WT7-4G59] (noting that most Americans believe drug users deserve treatment, not
punishment).
19. See Blake, supra note 13, at 485 (noting that a sympathetic portrayal arises in part
because many users initially obtained the drugs lawfully). But see Maia Szalavitz, The
Terrifying New Trend in Heroin Addiction, VICE (Oct. 17, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www
.vice.com/en_us/article/qvjgvb/the-terrifying-new-trend-in-heroin-addiction (noting that the
trend is changing so that more users are moving straight to heroin and bypassing prescription
painkillers).
20. Olga Khazan, The Link Between Opioids and Unemployment, ATLANTIC (Feb. 18,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/04/joblessness-and-opioids/523281
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drug treatment and overdose prevention for users.21 Policymakers and journalists
highlight the fact that opioid addiction affects white,22 young23 suburbanites.24 These
references to race and class work to differentiate opioid addiction in the popular
imagination from drug scourges from the last five decades, which instead primarily
affected poor people of color,25 thereby justifying—however implicitly—the calls
for a response to the opioid crisis that lies outside the criminal system.26

/ [https://perma.cc/32T6-UZW5] (noting scholars who document high rates of unemployment
where opioid misuse is highest); Sam Quinones, Guns and Opioids Are American Scourges
Fueled by Availability, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/02/24/opinion/sunday/guns-opioids-availability.html [https://perma.cc/J8R8-SZ22] (noting
isolation of white opioid users).
21. Michael J. Zoorob & Jason L. Salemi, Bowling Alone, Dying Together: The Role of
Social Capital in Mitigating the Drug Overdose Epidemic in the United States, 173 DRUG &
ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 1 (2017).
22. German Lopez, The Opioid Epidemic Has Now Reached Black America, VOX (Dec.
22, 2017, 2:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/12/22/16808490/opioid
-epidemic-black-white [https://perma.cc/97GJ-QULB] (citing statistics from the Centers for
Disease Control indicating that “[w]hite people still suffer a greater rate of overdose deaths,
and, as a majority of the population, they still make up much more of the raw total of overdose
deaths”).
23. Szalavitz, supra note 19 (noting that “[b]y now, many Americans have heard sad
stories that begin with a white teen innocently ingesting a prescription obtained from a
pharma-influenced doctor” (emphasis omitted)). Some scholars warn that exclusively
critiquing the ways that race defines state responses to drug epidemics understates the
important role played by class in shaping criminal justice policy. See, e.g., Rebecca Tiger,
Race, Class, and the Framing of Drug Epidemics, CONTEXTS (Dec. 18, 2017),
https://contexts.org/articles/race-class-drugs [https://perma.cc/FR4P-T2AM] (warning against
“exclusive focus on racial inequality in drug policy”).
24. Andrew Cohen, When Heroin Hits the White Suburbs, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug.
12, 2015, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/08/12/when-heroin-hits-the
-white-suburbs [https://perma.cc/B825-BLGU] (noting that “[t]he Center for Disease Control
says the cheap, easily accessible drug is attracting affluent suburbanites and women”); Elijah
Wolfson, Prescription Drugs Have Pushed Heroin into the Suburbs, NEWSWEEK (May 28,
2014, 6:21 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/prescription-drugs-have-pushed-heroin-suburbs
-252625 [https://perma.cc/C3S7-4EVE] (noting that heroin is affecting the “most posh and
desirable suburbs in the country”).
25. Seelye, supra note 16 (describing sympathetic portrayal of white opioid users and
citing Kimberle Crenshaw arguing “one cannot help notice that had this compassion existed
for African-Americans caught up in addiction and the behaviors it produces, the devastating
impact of mass incarceration upon entire communities would never have happened”).
26. See, e.g., Ed Stetzer, “‘Lock Them Up:’ My Double Standard in Responding to the
Crack Crisis vs. the Opioid Epidemic, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2017/10/26/lock-them-up-my-double-standard
-in-responding-to-the-crack-crisis-vs-the-opioid-epidemic/?noredirect=on&utm_term=
.e2d1559b8dec [https://perma.cc/A5F5-92Y2] (“In our rush to protect our communities, our
families and our values, we sought to put distance between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ We made groups,
constructed labels, and tried to do everything we could to separate what we perceived as the
‘clean’ from the ‘unclean’—in many cases, the white from the black.”); Ekow N. Yankah,
When Addiction Has a White Face, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com
/2016/02/09/opinion/when-addiction-has-a-white-face.html [https://perma.cc/B6JA-ZN36]
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Against this backdrop of a spike in fatal overdoses and a more compassionate
attitude toward opioid users, a growing number of police departments have moved
away from the use of arrest, detention, and initiation of criminal proceedings as the
primary means for addressing violations of drug-possession statutes.27 Instead, these
departments have adopted one of two distinct approaches, each of which incorporates
public-health perspectives on drug use and addiction. 28 The first is a pre-booking
program through which officers refer low-level alleged offenders to communitybased social services with an aim of diverting them from the criminal system. 29 The
second form allows individuals to walk into a precinct or approach an officer in the
community, relinquish their illicit drugs, and request admission to a detoxification
program—typically without fear of arrest or prosecution.30 While not explicitly

(“[T]he national attitude toward drug addiction is utterly different [from the 1990s and e]ven
Republican presidential candidates are eschewing the perennial tough-on-drugs speeches and
opening up about struggles within their own families.”).
27. Scholars and elected officials from both parties have shifted toward a critical view of
the War on Drugs. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6–7, 47–49, 53, 59 (2012); PETER MOSKOS,
COP IN THE HOOD: MY YEAR POLICING BALTIMORE’S EASTERN DISTRICT (2008) (decrying war
on drugs as a failure); Corey Booker, FACEBOOK (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.facebook.com
/corybooker/videos/10157111094132228 [https://perma.cc/WD5U-LMF9] (“For decades, the
failed War on Drugs has locked up millions of nonviolent drug offenders—especially for
marijuana-related offenses—at an incredible cost of lost human potential, torn apart families
and communities, and taxpayer dollars.”); Chris Christie, Face the Nation Transcripts June 7,
2015: Christie, de Blasio, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/face-the-nation
-transcripts-june-7-2015-christie-de-blasio [https://perma.cc/334W-MS2F] (“And I think,
quite frankly, the war on drugs has been a failure . . . . And let’s stop spending money on
incarcerating nonviolent people because they are drug-addicted.”).
28. See Elizabeth Joh, Imagining the Addict: Evaluating Social and Legal Responses to
Addiction, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 175, 192 (2009) (noting that with respect to drug policing,
traditionally, “[a] stark moralism tends to play a leading role in the perception of harm; other
perspectives from public health and public policy, secondary roles”).
29. See Katherine Beckett, The Uses and Abuses of Police Discretion: Toward Harm
Reduction Policing, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 77, 86 (2016) (“Seattle’s Law Enforcement
Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program is believed to be the first pre-booking diversion program
for people arrested on drug and prostitution charges in the United States.”); see also Sara Jean
Green, LEAD Program for Low-Level Drug Criminals Sees Success, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 9,
2015, 12:00 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/lead-program-for-low
-level-drug-criminals-sees-success [https://perma.cc/Z8NL-XEXL] (explaining that the
LEAD founders included prostitution as a qualifying offense because of data indicating that
“[w]hile men are more likely to be arrested for using or selling drugs, women involved with
drugs are most often arrested for prostitution”).
30. See, e.g., Brian MacQuarrie, “Angel” Opioid Initiative Thrives Despite Exit of
Gloucester Police Chief, BOS. GLOBE (July 18, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com
/metro/2017/02/21/angel-opioid-initiative-thrives-despite-exit-gloucester-police-chief
/hvH14GgG0dRYTXJOpGEswO/story.html [https://perma.cc/SK9Z-FJCC] (describing that
in 200 police agencies in twenty-eight states, departments have adopted an approach through
which people who come to the police department and ask for help for drug addiction will be
taken to a hospital and later placed in a recovery program and noting that some departments
also adopt a “‘no-arrest’” policy).
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confined to opioids, these new police approaches reflect and reinforce the
comparatively sympathetic popular view of opioid users. 31 This Article therefore
refers to them, collectively, as “opioid policing.”
On the one hand, opioid policing seems like progress. Its use of social services
programs to divert people from the criminal system renders it less costly and more
humane than War on Drugs policing, which included elements of militarization and
has been characterized by a heavy reliance on arrest.32 These tactics in turn led to
long prison sentences that disproportionately affected Black people—all with no
reduction in the availability of illicit drugs.33 In addition, opioid policing improves
upon the specialized, treatment-oriented drug courts created with the putative aim of
providing treatment to drug users to stop the cycle of criminal offending. Such courts,
which have proliferated in the last three decades, historically have demanded
abstinence from participants, consigning them to jail or prison if they relapse.34
Long-term outcomes for drug-court participants have been poor overall.35 By
contrast, opioid policing programs do not necessarily terminate participation for, or
consign to jail or prison, alleged offenders who relapse, or who do not stop using
illicit drugs in the first instance.36 Instead, they adopt a harm-reduction philosophy
that emphasizes attainment of housing, improvement of health, and avoidance of
crime.37
On the other hand, opioid policing retains troubling characteristics of each of
these earlier state responses to illicit drug use. For one, the design and

31. See, e.g., Hannah DelaCourt, Local Agencies Launch Program to Combat Opioid
Crisis, STARNEWS ONLINE (May 17, 2017, 5:02 PM), http://www.starnewsonline.com
/news/20170517/local-agencies-launch-program-to-combat-opioid-crisis
[https://perma.cc
/6X9G-9J3Y] (“The Wilmington Police Department and six other agencies joined together
Wednesday to take the first step in enacting a new program to address the opioid epidemic in
the region.”); Shawna Newcomb, Bangor Launches Law Enforcement-Assisted Opioid
Diversion Program, NEWS CTR. ME. (Mar. 1, 2017, 7:53 PM), http://www
.newscentermaine.com/article/news/local/bangor-launches-law-enforcement-assisted-opioid
-diversion-program/416973857 [https://perma.cc/US5N-HLCV] (referring to the LEAD
program as an “innovative approach to Opioid Use Disorder and the criminal justice system”).
32. See, e.g., MARC MAUER, THE CRISIS OF THE YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MALE AND
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999) (describing how police targeting of low-wealth areas,
disproportionately populated by people of color, created and exacerbated racial disparities in
incarceration for drug offenses, especially crack cocaine offenses).
33. See infra notes 159–78 and accompanying text. The enforcement of prohibition laws
proved equally costly and difficult, as noted in THE NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE &
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON THE ENF’T OF THE PROHIBITION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 78–
109 (1931).
34. See infra notes 193–251 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 262–69 and accompanying text.
36. Jag Davies, Expanding Drug Courts Won’t Help Ease the Opioid Crisis, STAT (Nov.
1, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/11/01/drug-courts-opioid-crisis/ [https://perma.cc
/2QY7-CHWR] (critiquing drug courts for “respond[ing] to the predictable relapses of drugdependent individuals by kicking them out of treatment and locking them up in jail” and
arguing that expanding drug courts, as suggested by the White House Opioid Commission,
will not help end the opioid overdose epidemic).
37. Beckett, supra note 29, at 77.
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implementation of some opioid policing programs create incentives for law
enforcement to expand, rather than reduce, surveillance of historically marginalized
populations.38 In addition, opioid policing has the potential to create significant racial
and socioeconomic disparities in terms of who benefits most.39 Indeed, careful
analysis of opioid policing reveals the limitations of drug-reform efforts situated
within law enforcement as well as the power and reach of the contemporary carceral
state.
This Article is the first to analyze each version of opioid policing.40 It contributes
to two separate yet related strands of criminal-law scholarship. It speaks first to the
literature that explores how arrest and prosecution are tools not only for responding
to crime but also for managing populations. Such work documents the harms of
arrest41 and prosecution42—even absent conviction—and argues that the
contemporary criminal system is problematically functioning as a mechanism of
social control that exacerbates distributional inequities and troubling power
dynamics.43 The Article also interacts with scholarship that imagines a supportive
state, outside the criminal apparatus, that can more effectively address, if not prevent
outright, the wide variety of social ills currently within the purview of the criminal
system.44

38. See infra notes 372–420 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 421–30 and accompanying text.
40. Two legal scholars have analyzed the programmatic development and early operation
of the Seattle LEAD program. See Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 165 (2013); Beckett, supra note 29. No legal scholar has yet considered the
second form of opioid policing.
41. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 307 (2016)
(“Given their costs, arrests should be used only when they serve an important state interest;
yet, they often happen even when no such interest exists”); Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation,
67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 809 (2015) (arguing that civil regulatory bodies that make decisions
based on arrests can pool resources with prosecutors and police officers, achieving a level of
enforcement neither could achieve alone, and describing this phenomenon as undermining
important aims of the criminal justice system); Anna Roberts, Arrests as Guilt, ALA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (noting
ways in which arrest has become fused with guilt and outlining harms of this fusion).
42. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L.
REV. 611, 615 (2014) (noting data showing that as misdemeanor arrests in New York City
rose, convictions fell and asserting that this result suggests that a managerial model of justice
has replaced an adjudicative one that functions to manage people over time through
engagement with the criminal justice system).
43. Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, MICH. L. REV. 3
n.11 (forthcoming 2019) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal)
(“‘[S]ocio-legal theories of power, social control, race, and institutional structure better
explain the criminal process and predict its outcomes.’” (quoting Alexandra Natapoff, The
Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING 71 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra
Natapoff eds., 2017))).
44. See, e.g., Amna Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV.
405, 405 (2018) (noting with approval how the Movement for Black Lives’ policy platform
advocates “shrinking the large footprint of policing, surveillance, and incarceration and
shifting resources into housing, health care, jobs, and schools” and urging legal scholars to
engage with this vision); Allegra McLeod, Prison Abolition and Grounded Justice, 62 UCLA

398

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:389

The Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out previous state responses to illicit
drug use upon which opioid policing improves—War on Drugs policing and drug
courts—and identifies the harms, costs, and limitations of each of these responses.
After sketching the contours of the contemporary opioid crisis, Part II argues that a
new theory of systemic discretion has emerged in the departments practicing opioid
policing. It then considers each form of opioid policing in detail. Part III analyzes the
promise of opioid policing. Part IV discusses its limitations.
I. PREVIOUS STATE RESPONSES: MAPPING THE CRITIQUES
A. War on Drugs Policing
1. A Tough-on-Crime, Racialized Politics
U.S. policymakers have referenced and relied on racial stereotypes in crafting
drug legislation at least since the beginning of the twentieth century.45 A
paradigmatic example is the federal government’s response to opium users during
this time period. Notably, both middle-class white people—particularly women—
and Chinese immigrants used the drug. Middle-class whites typically could easily
obtain prescriptions from doctors and ingest the drugs in the privacy of their homes.46
Chinese immigrants, by contrast, mostly obtained opium by visiting smoking dens
in urban areas.47 In 1909, Congress passed the Opium Exclusion Act, which targeted
only opium smokers.48 The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, enacted five years later,
made explicit that only medical professionals could legally dispense opiates. 49 Thus,

L. REV. 1156 (2015) (arguing for a prison abolitionist ethic, which entails gradual
decarceration and a substitution of other regulatory forms to address the social ills that we
currently allocate to policing). For arguments that the state should change to better support
families and that liberal democratic theory must take more seriously human dependency, see
MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S
POLITICAL IDEALS (2010); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
45. REBECCA TIGER, JUDGING ADDICTS: DRUG COURTS AND COERCION IN THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 28 (2013); Erik Luna, Drug War and Peace, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 813, 833–38
(2016) (providing examples of racialization in drug policy).
46. TIGER, supra note 45; Luna, supra note 45, at 834. See generally DAVID T.
COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: A HISTORY OF OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA (2001)
(tracing patterns of opiate addiction and comparative treatment based on race and class in the
late 1800s and early 1900s).
47. TIGER, supra note 45, at 29.
48. 21 U.S.C. §§ 176–85 (1909) (repealed 1970); CAROLINE JEAN ACKER, CREATING THE
AMERICAN JUNKIE: ADDICTION RESEARCH IN THE CLASSIC ERA OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 13
(2002) (noting that the Act banned the importation, possession, and smoking of opium).
49. Luna, supra note 45, at 829–30 (also noting that the Harrison Act sought to obtain
revenue for the federal government); see also ACKER, supra note 48, at 34 (“The Harrison Act
ended a period in which any substance could be packaged and sold as a medicine to the general
public.”); Laws: A History of Opiate Laws in the United States, NAT’L ALL. ADVOCATES FOR
BUPRENORPHINE TREATMENT, https://www.naabt.org/laws.cfm [https://perma.cc/PW9C
-LF6P].
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Chinese immigrants faced sanctions for using the same drugs that white citizens
could easily obtain from a physician, often even for a non-medical use.50 These laws
corresponded with rising xenophobic sentiment; many hoped the Opium Exclusion
Act might persuade immigrants to “go back to China.”51
Around this same time, marijuana legislation was also being driven by negative
perceptions of people of color, with whom the drug was most closely associated.52
At the state and federal level, legislators argued for marijuana’s criminalization by
drawing upon racist stereotypes.53 Mexican laborers in the Southwest became
associated with marijuana smoking, which was in turn blamed for their perceived
lawlessness.54 Arguing in support of a marijuana criminalization statute in Texas,
one senator in 1908 opined: “All Mexicans are crazy, and this stuff [marijuana] is
what makes them crazy.”55
By 1971, President Nixon was declaring drug abuse “public enemy number one”
and committing his administration to an “all-out offensive” to end it.56 As articulated
by the Nixon Administration, the War on Drugs had two, ostensibly equally
important goals: reducing demand through prevention and rehabilitation programs,
and curtailing supply through interdiction and other law enforcement initiatives.57
Nixon’s proposed federal budget that year actually allocated more money for
prevention than law enforcement. 58
The National Institute of Drug Abuse (NIDA), created in 1974,59 was founded on
the principle that addiction is a disease that is amenable to treatment;60 the NIDA’s

50. Federal law enforcement interpreted the Act as prohibiting prescriptions solely to
maintain an addiction, but middle-class patients could circumvent this prohibition. ACKER,
supra note 48, at 34 (citation omitted); Luna, supra note 45, at 830–31.
51. Luna, supra note 45, at 834 (citation omitted).
52. Jordan Cummings, Nonserious Marijuana Offenses and Noncitizens: Uncounseled
Pleas and Disproportionate Consequences, 62 UCLA L. REV. 510, 518–19 (2015) (noting
association in the public mind between marijuana and “Mexican, west Indians, Blacks, and
underworld whites”).
53. Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime, and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the
“War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 412 n.244 (2002)
(stating “political interest in maintaining the connection between drugs and race has been a
central theme of drug prohibition from the outset” (citation omitted)).
54. Steven W. Bender, Joint Reform?: The Interplay of State, Federal, and Hemispheric
Regulation of Recreational Marijuana and the Failed War on Drugs, 6 ALB. GOV’T L. REV.
359, 361–2 (2013).
55. Id. (documenting enactment in western states of laws prohibiting marijuana).
56. Conor Friedersdorf, The War on Drugs Turns 40, ATLANTIC (June 15, 2011), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/06/the-war-on-drugs-turns-40/240472
[https://
perma.cc/C64R-XRPL].
57. Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1323, 1328–29, 1331 (2016).
58. MICHAEL MASSING, THE FIX 112 (1998) (noting that Nixon proposed a federal drug
budget that allocated $105 million of $155 million to treatment); see also TIGER, supra note
45, at 29.
59. NAT’L INST. HEALTH, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, https://www.nih.gov/about
-nih/what-we-do/nih-almanac/national-institute-drug-abuse-nida
[https://perma.cc/CS6S
-5VF3].
60. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, UNDERSTANDING DRUG USE AND ADDICTION,
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existence stood for the proposition that drug users were deserving of rehabilitation.61
A Supreme Court case from a decade earlier had already recognized that the
condition of being addicted to drugs could not constitutionally be punished through
a criminal prosecution.62
Notwithstanding this stated commitment to treatment, the federal emphasis
quickly shifted to supply-side efforts. The Nixon Administration apparently
perceived political benefits in overstating the public-safety threat posed by illicit
drugs and employing a rhetorical strategy that linked this threat to racial minorities.
This strategy drew on racialized tropes from the previous five decades.63 Successive
presidential administrations from both parties64 have moved even farther from an
emphasis on treatment and prevention and toward punishment as the preferred mode
for addressing drug-law infractions, drawing on the historically entrenched
stereotypes linking drugs to people of color and people of color to crime.65
The tough-on-crime, racialized politics leading up to and following the War on
Drugs declaration has dramatically altered criminal sentencing.66 Most states

https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/understanding-drug-use-addiction
[https://perma.cc/2887-4ENJ] (last updated June 2018).
61. The Science of Drug Abuse and Addiction: The Basics, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/media-guide/science-drug-abuse-addiction-basics
[https://perma.cc/96UD-BVG8] (last updated July 2018).
62. Robinson v. California invalidated a state statute that purported to criminalize the
condition of being addicted to drugs. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
63. See, e.g., Dan Baum, Legalize It All: How To Win the War on Drugs, HARPER’S (Apr.
2016), https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all [https://perma.cc/G59J-TMEK]
(describing 1994 interview with John Ehrlichman, President Nixon’s domestic policy advisor,
in which Ehrlichman said, “The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after
that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people . . . . We knew we couldn’t make it
illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies
with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt
those communities . . . and vilify them night after night on the evening news”); Paul Butler,
The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform, 104
GEO. L.J. 1419, 1452 (2016) (also citing the Ehrlichman interview: “Look, we understood we
couldn’t make it illegal to be young or poor or black in the United States, but we could
criminalize their common pleasure . . . . We understood that drugs were not the health problem
we were making them out to be, but it was such a perfect issue . . . that we couldn’t resist it”
(alterations in original)).
64. See, e.g., IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL APPEALS
HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 28–29 (2014) (“Though
popularly associated with the Republicans, from the outset both parties adopted a Southern
strategy based on dog whistle racism . . . . Democrats themselves would soon pick up the
whistle at the national level, especially in the figures of two Southern politicians, Jimmy Carter
and Bill Clinton.” (emphasis omitted)).
65. See generally Dorothy Roberts, Democratizing Criminal Law as an Abolitionist
Project, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1597, 1600 (2017). For a recent exploration of how the Johnson
Administration’s anti-poverty initiatives laid the groundwork for the contemporary carceral
state, with a particularly disproportionate impact on people of color, see ELIZABETH HINTON,
FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME: THE MAKING OF MASS INCARCERATION
IN AMERICA (2016).
66. Arit John, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing,
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lengthened terms of incarceration, passed mandatory-minimum legislation, and
eliminated parole for drug offenses.67 One of the most notorious examples of the
harsh new sentencing regime occurred in New York. There, the legislature enacted a
set of statutes that became known as the Rockefeller Drug Laws. 68 These included a
provision for a fifteen-year-prison sentence for people convicted of selling two
ounces or possessing four ounces of narcotics. 69 Other states soon followed suit.70
These long sentences are characterized by racial disparities.71 For example, at the
federal level, Congress passed a law imposing significantly higher penalties for crack
use (associated with Black people) than powder cocaine use (associated with
whites).72 In New York, more than ninety percent of the people sentenced under the
Rockefeller Drug Laws were Black or Latino—a number dramatically out of
proportion to the percentage of drug-law offenders these groups constitute.73

ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline
-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-tough-on-crime-drug-sentencing/360983
[https://perma.cc/ZVD8
-YYER]. See generally KATHERINE BECKETT & THEODORE SASSON, THE POLITICS OF
INJUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (2d ed. 2004) (tracing the rise of the “tough
on crime” movement from the right’s political strategy of making crime a national issue in the
early 1970s to its usefulness to Democrats in the 1990s).
67. Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 429 (2013)
(“From 1980 to 2007, there was a roughly twenty-fold increase in the number of federal
offenders imprisoned for drug offenses—from 4900 in 1980 to 98,675 in 2007. [And d]uring
the same period, the number of arrests for sale and manufacture of drugs more than doubled,
[and d]rug offenders began to receive longer sentences than before.” (footnotes omitted)).
68. See N.Y. PENAL LAW 220.00 (McKinney 2004).
69. Madison Gray, New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, TIME (Apr. 2, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1888864,00.html [https://perma.cc/4EXH
-DF57]
70. Joe Kennedy, Breaking Pitiful (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law
Journal). Drug War sentencing practices manifest a “total incapacitation” theory of
punishment. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Dignity and Risk: The Long Road from Graham v.
Florida to Abolition of Life Without Parole, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH
PENALTY? 282, 293 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) (defining theory as
“the idea that imprisonment is appropriate whenever an offender poses any degree of risk to
the community”).
71. See infra notes 109–11, 126–33 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., ACLU, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL
CRACK COCAINE LAW I (2006) (discussing the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which imposed
five-year federal prison sentences for just five grams of cocaine, while for powder cocaine,
distribution of 500 grams—100 times the amount of crack cocaine—carried the same
sentence); Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010) (reducing
the disparity from a 100:1 disparity to an 18:1 disparity).
73. Carl Hart, People Are Dying Because of Ignorance, Not Because of Opioids,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/people-are
-dying-because-of-ignorance-not-because-of-opioids [https://perma.cc/FE9J-GHXN].
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2. Primacy of Arrest
a. Incentives
A critical component of the Reagan Administration’s continuation of the War on
Drugs was massive funding expenditures to local police departments. Made possible
by cuts to prevention and treatment, 74 these expenditures facilitated increases in
hiring of police officers and purchasing of equipment.75 Departments began to invest
in military-grade equipment: armored vehicles, night vision goggles, ballistic
helmets, tactical vests, televisions, cameras, computers, and even camping gear. 76
Along with the militarization of police departments came a growing reliance on
arrest as the primary weapon in the War on Drugs—for which there existed both
financial and cultural incentives. Certain federal grants were explicitly conditioned
on the number of drug arrests conducted.77 While the Department of Justice required
state and local agencies receiving federal funds to report on how many arrests they
made and the numbers of prosecutions that followed,78 grantees were not required to
report on whether people in need of drug treatment received it.79 These demands
signaled the prioritization of the appearance of cracking down on illicit drug use and
sale over improvement in or even measurement of drug treatment or public safety.80
In addition to funding incentives, incentives of police culture exist as well. Police
academies typically instill a “warrior” mentality in cadets. 81 An officer with such a

74. ALEX KREIT, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, TOWARD A PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH TO
DRUG POLICY 2–3 (2009), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Kreit-Issue
-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SB3-MHSB] (“The guiding tenet of the ‘war on drugs’ strategy
has been that vigorous enforcement of uncompromising criminal justice measures is the most
effective method to reduce drug abuse and associated problems. This philosophy has
manifested itself in an almost singular focus on supply-side initiatives, including the mass
incarceration of drug offenders at all levels of offense severity in an effort to deter domestic
drug manufacture and distribution . . . . Efforts aimed directly at demand reduction have largely
followed the same approach by increasing the number of arrests for drug possession and
addressing drug use and addiction problems primarily within the criminal justice system.”).
75. Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2184–85 (2016)
(summarizing federal-state initiatives); see also Karena Rahall, The Green to Blue Pipeline:
Defense Contractors and the Police Industrial Complex, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1785, 1791
(2015).
76. Rahall, supra note 75, at 1800 n.103.
77. Id.
78. INIMAI CHETTIAR ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REFORMING FUNDING TO
REDUCE MASS INCARCERATION 4 (2013) (explaining how a federal grant program generated
incentives to increase arrests, prosecutions, and incarcerations). Requirements also included
reports on the amount of cocaine seized. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; see also NICOLE FORTIER & INIMAI CHETTIAR, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
SUCCESS-ORIENTED FUNDING: REFORMING FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE GRANTS 1 (2015)
(“Today, a complex web of federal crime-fighting grants funnels billions of dollars across the
country . . . to encourage states to increase arrests, prosecutions, and incarceration, all in the
belief that harsher punishment would better control crime.”).
81. Seth Stoughton, Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE
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mentality sees himself as a uniquely skilled crime fighter, who must assume that the
individuals he approaches are hostile and potentially life-threatening.82 A warrior
mindset encourages a default to arrest when a citation or summons would suffice.83
An emphasis on arrest and aggressive tactics reached its apex with “broken
windows” policing.84 Described in a 1982 essay of the same name, broken windows
policing is proactive, relying on arrests for low-level misdemeanors—including
possessory drug offenses.85 The theory of this form of policing is that cracking down
on “disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks,
addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed” deters more
serious crime.86 Police departments deploy broken windows tactics in low-income,
urban communities of color, populated by people with already negative experiences
with police and who typically have insufficient social capital to resist.87
Constitutional criminal procedure places few meaningful restraints on policing,88
particularly policing of suspected drug-law offenders.89 Faced with an apparent and

FOREST L. REV. 611, 647 (2016).
82. In Paul Butler’s account, the problem is not only officer mindset but a series of
Supreme Court cases that have shown great deference to officers when confronted with
African American men, such that police have “super powers”—to arrest, racially profile, and
kill. Butler, supra note 63, at 1446.
83. Harmon, supra note 41, at 334 (noting that criminal proceedings can be initiated
through summonses and citations and need not begin with arrest).
84. Tom Tyler, From Harm Reduction to Community Engagement: Redefining the Goals
of American Policing in the Twenty-First Century, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2017); see also
Amna Akbar, National Security’s Broken Windows, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 872 (2015) (noting
that commentators have coined different terms to describe this version of policing including
“order-maintenance,” “hot-spot,” and “problem-oriented policing”).
85. James Q. Wilson & George F. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29. Jeffrey Fagan & Elliott Ash, New Policing, New
Segregation: From Ferguson to New York, 106 GEO L. J. ONLINE 33, 38 (2017) (describing
“proactivity” as core component of this form of policing and noting that it came to include a
wide range of police tactics, including “vigorous enforcement of laws against relatively minor
[misdemeanor] offenses”; the use of stop and frisk, or investigative stops; and drug
enforcement) (citation omitted)
86. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 85, at 32.
87. Stoughton, supra note 81. At the federal level, the Department of Justice was creating
policies on traffic stops that encouraged state troopers to engage in racial profiling of drivers.
David Kocieniewski, New Jersey Argues that the U.S. Wrote the Book on Race Profiling, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/29/nyregion/new-jersey-argues
-that-the-us-wrote-the-book-on-race-profiling.html (discussing Operation Pipeline federal
program).
88. Stoughton, supra note 81, at 648 (“The Supreme Court has consistently privileged
policing through its tendency to determine whether constitutional regulation is appropriate
—and, if so, what type of regulation is appropriate—in part by assessing whether the proposed
rule would burden law enforcement.”) (citation omitted).
89. Levin, supra note 75, at 2185–86 (“In their eagerness to combat drugs, the courts have
departed from longstanding fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendment protections . . . [and]
upheld (1) vague and over-inclusive search warrants; (2) searches conducted in the absence of
warrants and without either probable cause or individualized suspicion; (3) invasive hi-tech
surveillance . . .; and (4) drug courier profiles, often including racial and ethnic characteristics
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often unsympathetic drug dealer in a criminal prosecution, state and federal court
judges seem to struggle to allow meritorious motions to suppress.90 Courts’ deference
to the state in drug cases is great enough that scholars and jurists have identified a
“drug exception” to the Bill of Rights.91 In response, commentators increasingly call
for alternative, non-judicial modes of regulating the police generally, and in drug
cases particularly.92
These financial and cultural incentives for arrests predictably led to a dramatic
spike in their occurrence. Between 1980 and 2009, the arrest rate for drug possession
more than doubled;93 nearly 1.9 million such arrests occurred in 2006.94 In 2017,
there were more than 1.5 million arrests for drug-law violations.95 The overwhelming
percentage—eighty-five percent—were possessory offenses; of those, most were for
marijuana possession.96
b. Harms and Costs
Drug-law arrests create myriad individual and social harms.97 And, as shown
below, an arrest-first policy creates particular danger for people arrested in the throes
of opioid addiction.

. . . .”) (quoting John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The
National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 557,
578–79 (1991) (footnotes omitted)).
90. See generally Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 755–56 (2002)
(noting that while constitutional criminal procedure theoretically does not observe distinctions
among crimes, “numerous jurists and scholars have recognized that drug offenses receive
exceptional treatment in the criminal justice system” and that “[l]egal commentators have
likewise identified a ‘drug exception’ to the Bill of Rights created through judicial
acquiescence to the activities of narcotics agents”).
91. Id. at 758.
92. Rachel Harmon argues that courts are institutionally ill-equipped to regulate the police
and thus the reliance by reformers on constitutional criminal procedure to do so is misplaced.
Rachel Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 764 (2012) (asking “not
how the Constitution constrains the police but how law and public policy can best regulate the
police”). Others urge that constitutional criminal procedure should be seen not only as a means
to regulate the police but also a method of facilitating resistance by the populace to the state.
See, e.g., Alice Ristroph, Regulation or Resistance: A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1555, 1563 (2015) (“[C]onstitutional litigation creates a
way in which non-state actors can keep raising the subject, and there is value even in noticing
that the courts do not want to talk about it”).
93. HOWARD N. SNYDER, ARREST IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2009, at 9.
94. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUGS AND CRIME FACTS (2016),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/dcf/enforce.cfm [https://perma.cc/H99G-S8N8]
95. 2017 Crime in the United States, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/persons-arrested
[https://perma.cc/23AQ-CAAS].
96. Id.
97. Drug-war policing practices trouble both progressives and conservatives. Compare
Butler, supra note 63 (discussing pretextual stops and suspicion-less frisks), with Anthony L.
Fisher, The Disposable Life of a 20-Year-Old Confidential Informant, REASON, (June 15,
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i. Individual
Even when it does not result in conviction, 98 an arrest ushers in adverse
consequences.99 The severity of these consequences suggests, as Anna Roberts
argues, “an assumption of guilt (or an assumption that one’s likelihood of guilt is far
higher than the low threshold that probable cause suggests).” 100 These include
governmentally imposed consequences, consequences imposed by private entities,
and stigma.101 Governmentally imposed consequences include a widely accessible
record that can be difficult, if not impossible, to seal or expunge; probation or parole
violations; civil asset forfeiture; threats to rights of child custody; bans on receiving
public benefits; and, in some cases, adverse findings in legal cases when a judge uses
a prior arrest record to refuse to grant relief to which a defendant would otherwise be
eligible.102 Suspension from school can also result.103 Burdens imposed by private
entities include refusal to hire and other forms of workplace discipline. 104 Publication
of “mug shots” and the “perp walk”—the coordinated law enforcement and media
display of arrestees—bring humiliation and shame. 105
Each of these consequences endures upon conviction, which brings with it an
additional array of negative impacts. Convictions that do not involve jail or prison
sentences still create life altering harms, such as exclusion from the labor market and
loss of voting rights.106 The process of arrest and prosecution leads to significant
costs and fees—for probation, attorneys, general court costs, and incarceration
itself—which can multiply when an individual is unable to pay, subjecting her to
protracted entanglement in the criminal system, and sometimes additional penalties

2015),
http://reason.com/reasontv/2015/06/15/the-disposable-lives-of-confidential-inf
[https://perma.cc/Y5ZK-PMYG] (criticizing reliance on confidential informants.
98. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 42, at 641 (“[A]rrest without conviction is not only
possible, but is the norm.”).
99. Roberts, supra note 41, at 13–17 (summarizing consequences).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 13.
102. Id.
103. Legal Rights, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN & YOUTH (Aug. 3, 2018), http://jfcy.org/en
/rights/suspensions [https://perma.cc/T3DE-RVJC].
104. Roberts, supra note 41, at 14.
105. Id.
106. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & ACLU, EVERY 25 SECONDS: THE HUMAN TOLL OF
CRIMINALIZING DRUG USE IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2016) (“Each day, tens of thousands more
are convicted, cycle through jails and prisons, and spend extended periods on probation and
parole, often burdened with crippling debt from court-imposed fines and fees. Their criminal
records lock them out of jobs, housing, education, welfare assistance, voting, and much more,
and subject them to discrimination and stigma.”).
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such as loss of driver’s licenses.107 All told, the consequences accompanying arrest
and conviction can render full participation in civic life nearly impossible. 108
The negative impacts of drug arrests and convictions are not spread evenly or
equitably throughout the population.109 Although data show relatively similar levels
of illicit drug use among Black people and other racial groups—and a higher
tendency of whites to become dependent on drugs—police officers enforce the drug
laws in racially disproportionate ways.110 Between 1980 and 2000, for example, the
national Black drug arrest rate increased from roughly 6.5 to 29.1 (per 1000 persons),
while the white drug arrest rate increased much more modestly, from approximately
3.5 to 4.6 (per 1000 persons).111
Arresting and detaining people with addiction to opioids112 creates significant
health dangers. Deprived of access to the drugs, users can quickly become
dehydrated.113 Withdrawal-induced dehydration can be treated with intravenous
fluids.114 However, people who are jailed while addicted do not always receive
access to this care.115 Even when such care is available, jails frequently lack sufficient
numbers of trained staff to effectively monitor its provision.116 While no organization

107. See generally Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: CashRegister Justice in the Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1487–89 (2016) (surveying the
array of “criminal justice costs, fines, fees, restitution, surcharges, and interest”). In a landmark
victory, a federal district court judge, within the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals jurisdiction,
ruled that the state of Tennessee may no longer revoke driver’s licenses for failure to pay fines
and fees and found that “suspending licenses without an effective, non-discretionary safety
valve for the truly indigent violates both equal protection and due process principles.”
Robinson v. Purkey, No. 3:17-cv-01263, 2018 WL 2862772, at *53 (M.D. Tenn. June 11,
2018).
108. Roberts, supra note 41, at 13–17; see also Eisha Jain, Capitalizing on Criminal
Justice, 67 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1417–19 (2018) (noting that notwithstanding the enormous
negative impact wrought by these consequences, no agency is tasked with systematically
ensuring accuracy of these records, or correcting them when they are wrong).
109. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 79
(1995); see also Hannah LF Cooper, War on Drugs Policing and Police Brutality, 50 SUBST.
USE & MISUSE 1188 (2015) (describing disparities in Black arrests for drug use and noting that
drug arrests were more racially disparate than arrests in other offense categories); supra note
87 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM 2009 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH:
MENTAL HEALTH FINDINGS 24 fig.2.12 (2009) (noting that 8.8% of blacks, compared to 9.6%
of whites, reported using an illicit drug within the past month); Maia Szalavitz, Study: Whites
More Likely to Abuse Drugs than Blacks, TIME (Nov. 7, 2011), http://healthland.time.com
/2011/11/07/study-whites-more-likely-to-abuse-drugs-than-blacks [https://perma.cc/7YSA
-M5EN] (summarizing data from National Survey on Drug Use and Health).
111. Beckett, supra note 29, at 81. See also supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
112. For a definition of opioids, see infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text.
113. Julia Lurie, Go to Jail. Die from Drug Withdrawal. Welcome to the Criminal Justice
System, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 5, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics
/2017/02/opioid-withdrawal-jail-deaths [https://perma.cc/EDW7-NV2L].
114. Id.
115. Blake, supra note 13, at 489.
116. Lurie, supra note 113.
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tracks how many people have died from drug withdrawal in jail, at least twenty
lawsuits were filed between 2014 and 2016 alleging that an inmate died from
complications from opioid withdrawals—a number likely representing just a fraction
of such deaths.117 This number is on top of deaths from overdose that occur in jails
from opioids brought in at the time of arrest or smuggled in later. 118
Given that drug-law convictions continue to account for a significant portion of
the people sent to jail and prison each year,119 public-health experts call for drug
treatment, including medication-assisted treatment (MAT) and overdose prevention,
to be available for and accessible to people in jails and prisons; however, out of 3200
jails around the country, only 23 provide MAT to people who are detained, and of
the 50 state prison systems, only 4 do so.120 States historically are unwilling to fund
drug treatment for incarcerated people121 because of misguided but persistent notions
that “nothing works” for drug offenders.122 These policy decisions ignore the reality
that a person with untreated addiction upon release from jail or prison is particularly
vulnerable to relapse.123 And post-release relapses are extremely dangerous, as users
often return to the dose they were using prior to jail or prison—which is more than

117. Id.
118. Timothy Williams, Opioid Users Are Filling Jails: Why Don’t Jails Treat Them?,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2017, at A14.
119. E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2016, at 1 (2018)
(showing the rise of prison population from the 1980s). Scholars disagree about the extent to
which drug cases contribute to mass incarceration. Compare ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF
PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA 1–6 (2011) (blaming drug
prosecutions for prison growth in New York), with John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor: A
Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087 (noting little
empirical support for such claims).
120. See, e.g., Beth Schwartzapfel, A Better Way to Treat Addiction in Jail, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Mar. 1, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/03/01/a-better
-way-to-treat-addiction-in-jail [https://perma.cc/T8UA-9EX7]; see also infra note 182 and
accompanying text (defining medication-assisted treatment as the use of medications in
combination with behavioral and counseling therapies for substance use disorders).
121. JENNIFER BRONSON, JESSICA STROOP, STEPHANIE ZIMMER & MARCUS BERZOFSKY,
DRUG USE, DEPENDENCE, AND ABUSE AMONG STATE PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2007–
2009 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudaspji0709.pdf [https://perma.cc/APU3
-HB5R].
122. Gregory P. Fallin, Harry K. Wexler & Douglas S. Lipton, Drug Treatment in State
Prisons, in TREATING DRUG PROBLEMS (1992), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books
/NBK234751 [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/6DBT-KQ2K].
123. Megan McLemore, Prisons Are Making America’s Drug Problem Worse, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/11/prisons-are-makingamericas-drug-problem-worse [https://perma.cc/3M6M-3427] (explaining how the lack of
treatment options for inmates increases the harmful effects of incarceration); Aaron D. Fox et
al., Release from Incarceration, Relapse to Opioid Use and the Potential for Buprenorphine
Maintenance Treatment: A Qualitative Study of the Perceptions of Former Inmates with
Opioid Use Disorder, 10 ADDICT. SCI. CLIN. PRAC, no. 2, 2015, at 2 (finding that nearly three
quarters of people with opioid use disorder relapsed to heroin use within three months of
release from prison).
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their bodies can tolerate.124 The risk of fatal overdose is particularly acute in the two
weeks after release from jail or prison.125
ii. Social
Along with harm to individuals, the “arrest first” policing of the War on Drugs
has imposed negative community-wide impacts in the low-income neighborhoods of
color where it is practiced. A heavy police presence and aggressive tactics makes
entire communities feel under siege, regardless of any particular individual’s
wrongdoing,126 creating environments akin to a “hornet-like invasion where [young
males of color] are barraged with questions such as ‘where’s the weed?’ and ‘where’s
the guns?’”127 Environments characterized by arbitrary and heavy-handed policing
can, according to procedural justice scholars, undermine community members’ sense
that police officers are acting legitimately128 Those who perceive policing as
illegitimate are less likely to follow the law. 129 By the procedural justice account,
then, tough-on-crime policing practices from the War on Drugs fail as mechanisms
of deterrence. Even assuming that heavy police presence can deter illicit drug use, it
is far from clear that arrest is an officer’s best mechanism for doing so. Rather than
acting solely as “apprehension agents”130 officers could equally if not more
effectively deter and respond to crime through the issuance of criminal citations or

124. Williams, supra note 118.
125. Schwartzapfel, supra note 120; see also Shabbar I. Ranapurwala et al., Opioid
Overdose Mortality Among Former North Carolina Inmates: 2000–2015, 108 AM J. PUB.
HEALTH 1207, 1207–09 (2018) (noting that, within two weeks of their release, heroin overdose
death risk among former inmates was seventy-four times as high as non-incarcerated North
Carolina residents, respectively).
126. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE
L.J. 2054, 2087–88 (2017). See generally Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and
Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457,
462 (2000) noting that “the implementation of Broken Windows policies was
disproportionately concentrated in minority neighborhoods and conflated with poverty and
other signs of socio-economic disadvantage”); I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and
Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241, 1254–55 (2017) (discussing examples of racially
disproportionate policing tactics).
127. Kimberly D. Bailey, Watching Me: The War on Crime, Privacy, and the State, 47 U.
CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1539, 1557 (2014).
128. TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS, at xiv (2002) (ebook) (describing “procedural
justice” as “the belief that legal authorities are entitled to be obeyed and that the individual
ought to defer to their judgments” the importance of fair process to respect of the law and
describing such
129. Id. at 49–75, 141–51 (finding that deference to legal authorities is shaped by
procedural justice and trust in the motives of legal actors, and that minority group members
are less willing to defer to the decisions made by legal authorities as well as less likely to
report that their experiences with legal authorities are procedurally fair and unbiased).
130. Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 237–
40 (2013) (arguing that police deter more effectively as “sentinels” than as “apprehension
agents”).
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even warnings.131 Beyond questions of deterrence, the aggregate impact of decades
of War on Drugs policing in low-income communities of color has been a profound
sense of cultural dislocation and cynicism—what Monica Bell calls “legal
estrangement”132 and which she identifies as galvanizing the organized resistance of
groups like Black Lives Matter.133
In addition to these human costs, the War on Drugs has exacted great financial
costs. Over $50 billion are expended each year at the federal, state, and local level. 134
Well over half of that is spent on supply-side efforts, such as policing and arrests,
and interdiction.135 In 2018, the National Drug Control budget included an additional
$1.4 billion for international spending and $5 billion for interdiction efforts.136 The
high rates of incarceration that have resulted from the War on Drugs have placed
significant strain on the budgets of states, which have cut critical spending on
education and social services as a result.137
While Congress in 2018 allocated three billion dollars for the opioid crisis, some
of which is designated for treatment, experts argue that this amount is inadequate.138
The shredding of the social safety net and disinvestment in treatment options over
the last several decades underlies the current treatment gap in which only one in four
people with opioid use disorder receive specialty care and only twelve percent of
adults who need treatment for any substance use disorder receive it. 139

131. Harmon, supra note 41 (arguing that arrest is overused).
132. Bell, supra note 126, at 2086–87 (arguing that because “the law’s purpose is the
creation and maintenance of social bonds[,] [a]n emphasis on inclusion implies concerns not
only about how individuals perceive the police and the law (and thus whether those individuals
cooperate with the state’s demands), but about the signaling function of the police and the law
to groups about their place in society”).
133. Id. at 2088 (“[S]hifting the orientation of legitimacy theory from governmental power
to social inclusion is one way that theory can better capture the concerns of activists in the era
of Black Lives Matter”); see also Akbar, supra note 44, at 412–18 (noting the rebellions in
Ferguson and Baltimore and the formation of Black Lives Matter).
134. DRUG POL’Y ALL., supra note 9.
135. Id.
136. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NAT’L DRUG CONTROL BUDGET (2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/FY2018-Budget
-Highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBP4-56K8].
137. See, e.g., MICHAEL MITCHELL & MICHAEL LEACHMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, CHANGING PRIORITIES: STATE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORMS AND INVESTMENTS IN
EDUCATION 1 (2014) (showing the correlation between increasing prison costs and decreasing
spending on public education).
138. See, e.g., German Lopez, Congress’s Omnibus Bill Adds $3.3 Billion to Fight the
Opioid Crisis. It’s Not Enough, VOX, (Mar. 22, 2018, 12:20 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy
-and-politics/2018/3/22/17150294/congress-omnibus-bill-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc
/FDA8-9LQK] (citing experts).
139. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., FACING
ADDICTION IN AMERICA: THE SURGEON GENERAL’S SPOTLIGHT ON OPIOIDS 8 (2018), https://
addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/files/Spotlight-on-Opioids_09192018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RJG-6SFP]; see also LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE
NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 197–208 (2009) (explaining mass
incarceration of African Americans as a response to the destruction of the social safety net).
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The inefficacy of the War on Drugs is apparent in the fact that decades of
militarized policing, arrest, prosecution, and long prison sentences have not reduced
illicit drug use.140 Illicit drugs are now generally cheaper and more potent than before
the War on Drugs began.141 What is more, they remain widely accessible.142
B. Specialized Drug Courts
The harms, costs, and inefficacy of the War on Drugs have spurred a rethinking
and rejection of its tenets.143 One popular local reform effort is the specialized drug
court. One of the many so-called “problem-solving” courts144 to emerge in the last

140. Numerous studies suggest that there is no relationship between harsh criminal
penalties and reductions in illicit drug use. See, e.g., Jim Parsons & Scarlet Neath, Minimizing
Harm: Public Health and Justice System Responses to Drug Use and the Opioid Crisis, VERA
INST. JUSTICE (Dec. 2017), https://www.vera.org/publications/for-the-record-public-health
-justice-system-responses-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/B2F7-L662].
141. DAN WERB, THOMAS KERR, BOHDAN NOSYK, STEFFANIE STRATHDEE, JULIO
MONTANER & EVAN WOOD, THE TEMPORAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DRUG SUPPLY
INDICATORS: AN AUDIT OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS 3 (2013),
https://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/bmjopen/3/9/e003077.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JZ3N
-TPZ5] (“With few exceptions and despite increasing investments in enforcement-based
supply reduction efforts aimed at disrupting global drug supply, illegal drug prices have
generally decreased while drug purity has generally increased since 1990. These findings
suggest that expanding efforts at controlling the global illegal drug market through law
enforcement are failing.”).
142. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., HEALTH,
UNITED STATES, 2016, 213 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus16.pdf#050
[https://perma.cc/T3CL-FAAC] (showing continued use of drugs and current rates of drug use
in America); Daniel Denvir, The Opioid Crisis Is Blurring the Line Between Victim and
Perpetrator, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2018) (quoting drug policy expert Leo Beletsky stating “[w]e
have consistently invested in punishment and repression, while our health and social safety
nets have crumbled. Over time, crackdowns and incarceration supposed to dismantle drug
trafficking organizations have made illicit drug supplies cheaper, purer, and more readily
available”),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/the-opioid-crisis-is-blurring-the
-legal-lines-between-victim-and-perpetrator.html [https://perma.cc/D2PB-LMQX].
143. Voters Have Little Faith in War on Drugs, RASMUSSEN REPS. (Jan. 10, 2018),
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/january_2018/vot
ers_have_little_faith_in_war_on_drugs [https://perma.cc/7HSR-6T9H] (finding that only
nine percent of “likely U.S. voters” think the United States is winning the War on Drugs); see
also Rethinking America’s War on Drugs as a Public-Health Issue, 357 LANCET 971, 971
(2001) (editorial) (noting a 2001 Pew survey in which fifty percent of those surveyed said drug
use should be considered a disease not a crime and that fifty-eight percent of those younger
than thirty years expressed this view); supra note 27 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., SUPER. CT. OF CAL., COUNTY OF ORANGE, COLLABORATIVE COURTS (2017),
http://www.occourts.org/directory/collaborative-courts
[https://perma.cc/XQ7Z-A7XK]
(defining problem-solving courts as “specialized court tracks that address underlying issues
that may be present in the lives of persons who come before the court on criminal, juvenile, or
dependency matters,” including mental health courts, girls’ courts, and veterans’ courts).
Some commentators have criticized the term “problem-solving” for being presumptuous and
overly ambitious. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and
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thirty years, drug courts started in Florida in 1989.145 They have spread to every state
and currently number over three thousand.146
In a drug court, an offender who would otherwise face a jail or prison sentence is
given an opportunity to avoid it. To do so, she must plead guilty to the underlying
offense and then successfully complete a court-ordered monitoring and rehabilitation
regimen during the pendency of the suspended sentence,147 which may include
outpatient and sometimes inpatient treatment; random drug screens; and intensive
supervision by probation officers, including an order to avoid re-arrest.148 Frequent
court appearances occur, at which the judge, typically adopting an inquisitorial
role,149 scolds or praises, depending on probation reports on treatment progress and
the offender’s attitude about her addiction.150 The adversarial positions of criminal
court collapse, and defense attorneys, prosecutors, and probation officers operate as
a “team.”151 Success means court supervision ends; failing to complete the
requirements leads to the imposition of the sentence.
While drug courts have won praise across the political spectrum—tough-on-crime
conservatives appreciate the incarceration threat, while liberals support the notion of
rehabilitation152—the courts at the same time are riddled with problematic features
that complicate their most ambitious claims. For one, they rest on theoretical
premises about addiction and its treatment that are contraindicated by public-health
and scientific findings.153 In addition, they operate according to an understanding
about the link between drug dependency and criminal activity that is contested. 154
Finally, notwithstanding their therapeutic trappings, they remain firmly entrenched

Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1606 n.72 (2012) (describing the
decision to instead use the term “problem-oriented” as a way of suggesting that courts may
not in fact solve the problems they set out to solve).
145. Eric J. Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise of Judicial
Interventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1488 (2004).
146. TIGER, supra note 45, at 17.
147. Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 603 (2016).
While a small number of drug courts operate part of a deferred prosecution and thus prior to
the taking of a guilty plea, most contemporary drug courts employ a post-plea model. See
TIGER, supra note 45, at 21.
148. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, NEITHER JUSTICE NOR TREATMENT: DRUG COURTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2017); Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 783, 806 (2008).
149. Bowers, supra note 148, at 784.
150. TIGER, supra note 45, at 19; see also Eaglin, supra note 147, at 603 (describing drug
courts’ abandonment of the traditional adversarial proceeding of criminal court adjudications).
151. For an exemplary critique of how defendants are ill-served by this non-adversarial
structure, see Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway—Musings of a Public Defender
About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 55–56, 61–63
(2000).
152. Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417,
425 (2009).
153. See infra notes 193–235 and accompanying text.
154. See infra note 244–52 and accompanying text.
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within the criminal system.155 As a result, participants too frequently suffer many of
the same harmful life outcomes as people prosecuted outside of drug court. 156
1. The Problem with Compulsory Treatment
The notion of addiction as a chronic and relapsing disease of the brain increasingly
finds support in the medical and public-health establishment.157 The growing public
acceptance of this view surely has reduced the stigma that has long attached to users
of illicit drugs.158 That drug addiction is a disease is an ideological pillar of drug
courts.159
It might seem that if addiction is a disease, one of the features of which is relapse,
then the use of criminal sanctions for relapse could constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.160 Yet defense attorneys have not prevailed in making such arguments.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2018 rejected a claim by a probationer
that a jail sanction for relapse when she was ordered to remain drug-free violates the

155. See infra notes, 254–76, and accompanying text; see also Michael M. O’Hear,
Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 828 (2004) (explaining drug courts as
“‘insider reform’ . . . adopted by officials within the criminal justice system and intended to
deal with institutional problems like caseload pressures and prison overcrowding” and
contrasting them with reform movements such as medical marijuana and marijuana
decriminalization pushed by people outside the criminal system).
156. O’Hear, supra note 156 (conceptualizing these features as arising in part because of
the influence of federal money, which is conditioned on drug courts adopting policies
consistent with punitive, enforcement-oriented federal drug policy agenda).
157. See Nora D. Volkow, George F. Koob & A. Thomas McLellan, Neurobiologic
Advances from the Brain Disease Model of Addiction, 374 N. ENG. J. MED. 363 (2016)
(reviewing neurobiological evidence showing the link between brain function and addiction);
supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text (noting that the National Institute on Drug Abuse
was founded on this notion).
158. See, e.g., Brief for the Probationer on a Reported Question and on Appeal from a
Finding of Probation Violation from the Concord Division of the District Court Department
at 4, Commonwealth v. Eldred, 101 N.E.3d 911 (Mass. 2018) (arguing that “science now
recognizes that drug addiction . . . is not caused by moral turpitude but rather is a chronic brain
disease whose defining feature is the compulsive use of a substance ‘despite significant
substance-related problems’”); id. at 2–3 (citing Alfred Prentice, The Problem of the Drug
Addict, 76 J. AMERICAN MED. ASS’N 1551, 1556 (1921) (noting that “unfortunates suffering
from narcotic addiction [were] weak-minded deteriorated wretches, mental and moral
derelicts, pandering to morbid sensuality; taking a drug to soothe them into dream states and
give them languorous delight; held by us all in despite [sic] and disgust, and regarded as so
depraved that the rescue is impossible and they unworthy of its attempt”).
159. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BJA DRUG COURT DISCRETIONARY GRANT
PROGRAM: FY 2011 REQUIREMENTS RESOURCE GUIDE 3 (2011) (“Drug court practitioners
understand that drug addiction is a complex, chronic, relapsing disease.”)..
160. David Sack, 5 Ways We Punish Addicts – and Why We Should Stop, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(Oct.13,
2014),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/where-science-meets-the
-steps/201410/5-ways-we-punish-addicts-and-why-we-should-stop [https://perma.cc/SE6E
-3FPD] (“Substance use disorders are not just a criminal justice issue, but also a major publichealth concern. Decades of research demonstrate that addiction is a disease of the brain — one
that can be prevented, treated, and from which people can recover.”).
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Eighth Amendment,161 relying on the U.S. Supreme Court case that found criminal
behavior arising from intoxication was properly subject to criminal punishment.162
Drug court proponents and practitioners reconcile what seems to be a
contradiction between a disease framework and the imposition of criminal
punishment. They do so through a belief that “tough love” in the form of criminal
sanctions can best motivate a drug user to manage her illness and maintain
sobriety.163 Indeed, the whole point of a drug court is to “capitalize on the trauma of
arrest” in order to show the drug user that even more serious criminal consequences
can follow if the drug use does not cease.164 Judges will impose a set of graduated
sanctions—periods of “flash” incarceration and, eventually, imposition of a jail or
prison sentence—when the addicted person relapses or is otherwise believed to be
out of compliance with the mandated treatment.165 Drug court ideology holds, then,
that criminal tools can have therapeutic benefits. 166
While this belief in the usefulness of coerced treatment is a hallmark of drug
courts—an administrator’s statement that “force is the best medicine” for treating
addiction is emblematic of this thinking167—recent scientific findings do not support
it. The notion that people who seek treatment only to avoid the imposition of a
criminal sanction are more motivated to complete it than people who enter treatment
voluntarily is increasingly contested.168 A recent evaluation of drug court data reveals
that “the limited literature on this subject did not, on the whole, suggest improved
outcomes from compulsory treatment, with some studies suggesting harms.” 169
What is more, the dominant drug court framework does not make room for the
body of research suggesting that people who abuse and become addicted to drugs

161. Commonwealth v. Eldred, 101 N.E.3d 911, 917 (Mass. 2018).
162. Id. at 919 (“There can be no question of the authority of the State . . . to regulate the .
. . use of . . . drugs [through, inter alia] a program of compulsory treatment for those addicted
to narcotics[,] . . . [even requiring] involuntary confinement [and] penal sanctions for failure
to comply with established compulsory treatment procedures.” (citing Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962)).
163. See generally Maura Ewing, The Court System Shouldn’t Interrupt the Treatment
Process, ATLANTIC (Dec. 16, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017
/12/opioids-massachusetts-supreme-court/548480/ [https://perma.cc/M7UQ-ZPVL] (quoting
Harvard Medical School psychiatry professor John Kelly arguing against notion that drug
addicts lose the ability to make choices and “that the degree to which a person loses their
ability to avoid relapsing depends on their addiction’s severity”).
164. TIGER, supra note 45, at 20.
165. TIGER, supra note 45, at 108–10.
166. Id.
167. Maia Szalavitz, Five Myths About Heroin, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-heroin/2016/03/04/c5609b0e
-d500-11e5-b195-2e29a4e13425_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.74f61db2cf0a
[https://perma.cc/W4GU-77DH].
168. TIGER, supra note 45, at 108–10.
169. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 19 (noting a 2016 study); D. Werb,
A. Kamarulzaman, M.C. Meacham, C. Rafful, B. Fisher, S.A. Strathdee & E. Wood , The
Effectiveness of Compulsory Drug Treatment: A Systematic Review, 28 INT. J. DRUG POLICY
9 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4752879 [https://perma.cc/NVW3
-BTCY].

414

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:389

often do so because of a lack of “competing re-inforcers.”170 This social science
scholarship complicates the disease narrative by noting that both the crack and opioid
crises have occurred disproportionately in low-income communities among
individuals with few affordable sources of purpose or pleasure.171 As one
commentator puts it, “[i]f you’re living in a poor neighborhood deprived of options,
there’s a certain rationality to keep taking a drug that will give you some temporary
pleasure.”172 Notwithstanding the evidence of sociocultural factors underlying
addiction, drug courts maintain an individualistic paradigm with an emphasis on
personal responsibility.173
2. The Problem of the Abstinence Imperative
Drug courts rest on a commitment to abstinence.174 Some disallow even certain
prescribed medications.175 While a single relapse may not result in termination of
probation and imposition of a jail or prison sentence, drug court administrators must
believe that the offender is progressing in her commitment to abstinence.176 A refusal
to accept that one is an addict and needs treatment can count against a participant;
the discretion of a drug court judge is more likely to be deployed negatively against
an offender with a perceived poor attitude.177
The corollary of the drug court’s abstinence imperative is skepticism about the
principles and practices of harm reduction.178 Harm reduction accepts that some
illicit drug use is inevitable. 179 Its strategies center on reducing the negative effects

170. See, e.g., Carl L. Hart, As With Other Problems, Class Affects Addiction, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/02/10/what-is-addiction/aswith-other-problems-class-affects-addiction [https://perma.cc/D4VP-SSSS] (arguing that
addiction disproportionately affects poor people because they have few “competing
reinforcers”—affordable sources of pleasure and purpose—and thus that the notion of
addiction as a disease is overly simplistic); see also Warren K. Bickel, Matthew W. Johnson,
Mikhail N. Koffarnus, James MacKillop & James G. Murphy, The Behavioral Economics of
Substance Use Disorders: Reinforcement Pathologies and Their Repair, 10 ANN. REV. OF
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 641, 654 (2014) (noting “considerable experimental and descriptive
evidence [that] supports the importance of alternative reinforcers . . . [and that] the highest
rates of substance use are present in contexts with the least availability of substance-free
reinforcements, such as palatable food, exercise, enriched housing, and social access.”).
171. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 170.
172. John Tierney, The Rational Choices of Crack Addicts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/science/the-rational-choices-of-crack-addicts.html
[https://perma.cc/5AWJ-R3R7] (citation omitted) (arguing that crack use was best seen as a
symptom rather than a cause of unemployment and other social ills).
173. TIGER, supra note 45, at 107.
174. Id. at 136–38 (noting that the National Association of Drug Court Professionals, the
primary advocacy group for drug courts, highlights ensuring abstinence as one of ten key
components of the U.S. drug court model).
175. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 13.
176. TIGER, supra note 45, at 9.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 136–38.
179. Karen Mary Leslie, Harm Reduction: An Approach to Reducing Risky Health
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of drug use, and the philosophy rests on tenets of public health rather than criminal
justice.180 Its practices include needle exchanges, safe injection sites, and distribution
of the overdose-reversing drug Naloxone, among others.181 Rather than seek to
eradicate all illicit drug use, harm reduction proponents accept the likely continuation
of illegal drug use and seek to minimize its secondary harms.182
The skepticism among drug-court practitioners about harm reduction sometimes
extends even to medication-assisted treatment, despite its clear benefits for people
who are addicted.183 MAT comprises medications such as buprenorphine,
methadone, and naltrexone184 administered in conjunction with behavioral and
counseling therapies. MAT medications help people addicted to opioids by
eliminating psychological cravings without inducing withdrawal symptoms.185 They
make overdose-related death significantly less likely;186 MAT is more effective than
either medication or behavioral therapy alone. 187 Notwithstanding these benefits,
many drug court practitioners are opposed to MAT.188 One source of opposition is
the belief that provision of overdose-reversing medications to drug addicts
incentivizes illicit drug use189 and that this risk outweighs its benefits in reducing the

Behaviors in Adolescents, 13 PEDIATRICS & CHILD HEALTH 53, 53 (2008).
180. Expert Insights on the Challenges and Promise of Implementing Harm Reduction
Strategies, VERA, https://www.vera.org/publications/new-normal-opioid-use-criminal-justice
-system/new-normal-opioid-use-criminal-justice-system/expert-insights
[https://perma.cc
/FNW5-4ZR8].
181. Id.
182. What is Harm Reduction?, N.C. HARM REDUCTION COALITION, http://www
.nchrc.org/harm-reduction/what-is-harm-reduction [https://perma.cc/7QWK-X2BQ]
183. Harlan Matusow, Samuel L. Dickman, Josiah D. Rich, Chunki Fong, Dora M.
Dumont, Carolyn Hardin, Douglas Marlowe & Andrew Rosenblum, Medication Assisted
Treatment in U.S. Drug Courts: Results from a Nationwide Survey of Availability, Barriers
and Attitudes, 44 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 473, 477 (2012).
184. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 9; see also Nora D. Volkow,
Thomas R. Frieden, Pamela S. Hyde & Stephen S. Cha, Medication-Assisted Therapies:
Tackling the Opioid-Overdose Epidemic, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2063, 2064 (2014) (detailing
types of medications).
185. German Lopez, How to Stop the Deadliest Drug Overdose Crisis in American History,
VOX (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/8/1/15746780/opioid
-epidemic-end [https://perma.cc/4SED-MJW3].
186. Painkiller Abuse Treated by Sustained Buprenorphine/Naloxone, NAT’L INST.
HEALTH (Nov. 8, 2011), https://www.nih.gov/news-events/news-releases/painkiller-abuse
-treated-sustained-buprenorphine/naloxone [https://perma.cc/S3PM-QUMX].
187. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT IMPROVES OUTCOMES
FOR PATIENTS WITH OPIOID USE DISORDER (2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets
/2016/11/medicationassistedtreatment_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/JPV3-EZR3]; see also Martin
T. Hall, Jordan Wilfong, Ruth A. Huebner, Lynn Posze & Tina Willauer, Medication-Assisted
Treatment Improves Child Permanency Outcomes for Opioid-Using Families in the Child
Welfare System, 71 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 63 (2016) (MAT users involved in the
child welfare system were more likely to retain custody of their children than those not using
MAT).
188. Matusow et al., supra note 183, at 478.
189. VERA, supra note 180 (citing an expert noting that a commonly shared misconception
among drug court administrators is that equipping drug users with naloxone incentivizes
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likelihood of fatal overdose.190 In addition, some drug courts discourage MAT use
because of stigma191 derived from the notion that MAT is simply “replac[ing] one
addiction with another.”192 Another misconception is that MAT negatively affects
cognitive capacity and basic functioning.193 A final barrier to widespread adoption
of MAT is that the medications can be prohibitively costly and difficult to obtain194
—particularly in rural areas.195
3. The Problem of an Exclusive Emphasis on Addiction
An additional premise of drug courts is that a participant’s addiction leads to
criminal activity, including commission of violent crime, if it is not cured. 196 The
inverse of this premise is that curing addiction will eliminate criminal activity. These
beliefs in turn reinforce the abstinence imperative. 197 Yet the link between addiction
and criminality is not as certain as drug-court ideology would suggest. And,
inasmuch as there is a connection between drug use and crime, it is difficult to
discount the many negative social and economic factors—homelessness and
unemployment, for example—that frequently accompany addiction and that may
equally explain criminal activity.198
Shima Baradaran explains:
The literature generally suggests that criminal activity is neither an
inevitable consequence of illicit drug use (apart from the illegal
nature of drug use itself) nor [is illicit drug use] a necessary or sufficient
condition for criminal behavior. Many illegal drug users commit no other
kinds of crimes, and many persons who commit crimes never use illegal
drugs. Furthermore, even when people commit crimes while using illegal
drugs, there may not be a causal connection between the two.199

riskier using behavior); see also Ellen Sousares, The Failure of Catch and Release Treatment
Court, FIX (July 8, 2014), https://www.thefix.com/content/drug-treatment-court-mother
-heroin-addict2088?page=2 [https://perma.cc/F59G-3UML].
190. See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text.
191. Matusow et al., supra note 183.
192. Volkow et al., supra note 184, at 2065.
193. Barbara Andraka-Christou, What is “Treatment” for Opioid Addiction in ProblemSolving Courts? A Study of 20 Indiana Drug and Veterans Courts, 13 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. &
CIV. LIBERTIES 189, 238 (2017) (noting the belief that people using MAT behave like
“zombies”).
194. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 9.
195. Barbara Andraka-Christou, Improving Drug Courts Through Medication-Assisted
Treatment for Addiction, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 179, 209 (2016).
196. Eaglin, supra note 147, at 603.
197. Id.
198. See Elizabeth C. Prom-Wormley, Jane Ebejer, Danielle M. Dick & M. Scott Bowers,
The Genetic Epidemiology of Substance Use Disorder: A Review, 180 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE 241, 241 (2017) (noting how both genetic and environmental factors can impact
substance use disorder and addiction).
199. Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 227, 273 n.235 (2015)
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Despite this literature, drug courts maintain a near-exclusive focus on preventing
drug use and curing addiction. The rehabilitation discourse of drug court emphasizes
personal responsibility to the exclusion of addressing economic and social factors
that contribute to, and exacerbate the harms of, addiction.200 Drug court probation
officers work to move users away from a so-called drug “lifestyle” and acculturate
within them a work ethic perceived to be absent.201 And when the drug-court
participant does not fulfill the probation conditions intended to move her to sobriety,
criminal consequences result.202
4. The Vetting Problem
The drug court process can be protracted, invasive, and demeaning, with
paternalistic judges inquiring into personal details of participants’ lives and making
demands frequently unrelated to the underlying charge. 203 Drug court practitioners
and proponents justify these features because they believe drug courts offer critical
and otherwise inaccessible rehabilitation and treatment to people who will benefit
from it.204
The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. A foundational 2008 critique of drug
courts found that the courts were less likely to enroll individuals who were
legitimately drug-dependent or addicted than they were to accept people seeking a
drug-court placement simply to avoid incarceration. 205 Insufficient vetting of
defendants can lead to enrollment of defendants simply trying opportunistically—
and understandably—to game the system to avoid jail or prison rather than because
they legitimately have a drug addiction problem that could benefit from treatment. 206
In addition, even when vetting occurs, drug court personnel may inappropriately

(citation omitted).
200. Nicole Kaufman, Joshua Kaiser & Cesraéa Rumpf, Beyond Punishment: The Penal
State’s Interventionist, Covert, and Negligent Modalities of Control, 43 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
468, 476 (2018). Some scholars have argued for a more holistic understanding of the reasons
for drug use. See, e.g., Katherine McLean, “There’s Nothing Here”: Deindustrialization as
Risk Environment for Overdose, 29 INT’L J. DRUG POL. 19, 19 (2016) (“While state and county
efforts to ameliorate overdose mortality have focused upon creating an open market in
naloxone, this study suggests the need for interventions that address the poverty and social
isolation of opiate users in the post-industrial periphery.”).
201. KERWIN KAYE BROOK, DRUG COURTS AND THE TREATMENT OF ADDICTION:
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE (2010) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
202. Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417,
425 (2009) (noting that combination of an emphasis on personal change and the threat of
incarceration explain drug courts’ bipartisan appeal).
203. Tiger, supra note 23.
204. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 151, at 53.
205. Bowers, supra note 148, at 833.
206. Id. at 783 (“[D]rug courts provide particularly poor results for the very defendants
that they are intended to help most. Specifically, the most likely participants to graduate are
volitional drug users, who strategically game exit from undesired conventional punishment
and entry into treatment that they, in fact, do not need.”).
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equate an individual’s self-reported drug use with drug abuse.207 Such mistakes are
not surprising, given that the evaluations of potential enrollees are typically done not
by trained physicians but by drug court staff; decisions about the participants’ failure
or success are made not by addiction specialists but by judges, who similarly equate
use with abuse.208
The pressure on drug courts to show that they are effective in reducing recidivism
creates incentives for administrators to select clients likely to successfully complete
the program. Yet, as described above, these are not necessarily the clients most in
need of treatment.209 A further example of “cherry picking” clients can be found in
the fact that drug courts often enroll only individuals with no criminal record—or at
least no prior convictions of violent crimes. 210 This exclusion makes little sense in
the face of considerable evidence that the highest-risk offenders in terms of criminal
records in fact make the best use of the kind of rehabilitative intervention found in
the drug court.211
Similarly, drug courts tend to accept people charged only with possessory
offenses.212 However, this restriction belies the fact that the line between those who
distribute drugs and those who use them is sometimes conceptually thin and
therapeutically meaningless. For example, many drug users sell to support their own
drug dependency.213 In addition, drug users frequently share drugs with friends or
family members, and they all may take them together.214
For those drug-court participants who fail, the jail or prison sentence that is
imposed is typically longer than the sentence that was offered pursuant to a proposed
plea deal at the outset of criminal proceedings. 215 Unfortunately and predictably,

207. Id. at 800.
208. Id. at 784.
209. TIGER, supra note 45, at 15.
210. Id. at 14–15.
211. Id. at 15.
212. Id.
213. Shirley J. Semple, Steffanie A. Strathdee, Tyson Volkmann, Jim Zians & Thomas L.
Patterson, High on My Own Supply: Correlates of Drug Dealing Among HeterosexuallyIdentified Methamphetamine Users, AM. J. ADDICT. (2011) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC3197264 [https://perma.cc/L4WU-78JD] (“Drug dealers and drug users are
often viewed as distinct groups in the context of social, legal, and public health risk, but many
drug users also participate in the drug economy, blurring this distinction”).
214. See, e.g., Katherine M. Keyes, Magdalena Cerdá, Joanne E. Brady, Jennifer R. Havens
& Sandro Galea, Understanding the Rural-Urban Differences in Nonmedical Prescription
Opioid Use and Abuse in the United States, AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (2014),
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2013.301709
[https://perma.cc
/26V8-EZA3] (“A higher density of available opioids may create opportunities for illegal
markets in rural areas because family and friends are a primary distribution source of
nonmedical prescription opioids.”).
215. Bowers, supra note 148, at 811–15 (detailing reasons that drug users overestimate
their ability to complete drug court programs, including the participants’ unrealistic
assessment of their own ability to complete the drug-court regimen at the outset of criminal
proceedings, which is heightened if the offender is detained at the time of the decision about
whether to accept a drug-court option or an incarcerative sentence, and explaining the plea
deals offered at the outset of prosecution).
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those who end up in jail or prison are likely to be from the same marginalized
populations as those negatively affected by War on Drugs policing.216
5. Absence of Accountability
Drug courts thus far remain popular, notwithstanding their ideological and
operational problems. Part of the reason for their popularity likely is that their actual
success rates are difficult to determine, such that drug-court proponents’ claims come
to be accepted as true. Drug courts escape scrutiny at least in part because the
National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) is both an organized
advocacy group for drug courts and their primary evaluator.217 This fact helps explain
some of the slipperiness of the drug court data that its proponents offer. 218 For
example, the quantitative evaluation tools used for drug courts purport to show that
these courts work in saving money and reducing recidivism.219 Yet these evaluations
in fact focus only on drug court participants who graduate, eliding any mention of
the 30%–70% of participants who fail to make it that far.220 In addition, the
evaluations have not examined how drug court participants would fare in a
community-based supervision program operated entirely separately from the
court.221
Finally, while drug courts require the participant to alter his or her conduct, there
is no corresponding mechanism to hold courts accountable when they provide
substandard treatment and services. And recent studies show that many drug courts
are indeed substandard. Human rights activists have documented that the treatment
provided through drug courts is not evidence-based. In addition, they note instances
of drug court administrators violating participants’ confidentiality rights. 222
II. OPIOID POLICING: THEORY AND PRACTICE
This Part identifies and describes a local law enforcement approach that departs
from and in important ways improves upon tenets and practices of both War on Drugs
policing and the specialized drug court—what the Article refers to as “opioid
policing.” Section A provides a brief overview of the history, nature, and scope of

216. Id. (noting that the most likely treatment failures are genuine addicts and members of
historically disadvantaged groups).
217. TIGER, supra note 45, at 20.
218. Id.
219. Eaglin, supra note 147, at 605; see also Jessica M. Eaglin, Against Neorehabilitation,
66 SMU L. REV. 189, 190–95 (2013) (identifying drug courts as one of several
“neorehabilitationist” reforms and criticizing such reforms as problematic for
institutionalizing a focus on the least risky offenders, exacerbating racial disparities, and
distorting perceptions of what criminal justice should do); Treatment Courts Work, NAT’L
ASS’N DRUG CT. PROFS., http://www.nadcp.org/treatmentcourts/ [https://perma.cc/7HH7
-VN6G].
220. TIGER, supra note 45, at 20.
221. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 20 (outlining additional problems
of evaluations).
222. Id. at 16.
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the contemporary opioid crisis. 223 Section B discusses the theory of systemic
discretion underlying opioid policing and provides a detailed description of its two
primary forms.
A. Overview of the Opioid Crisis
Opioids are a class of drugs that includes pain relievers available legally by
prescription, such as oxycodone, marketed as OxyContin; hydrocodone, marketed as
Vicodin; codeine; morphine; the illegal drug heroin; and synthetic products such as
fentanyl and carfentanil.224 Each is chemically related and interacts with opioid
receptors on nerve cells in the body and brain, producing pain relief and euphoria.225
While opioid misuse was not uncommon in the twentieth century,226 today’s
opioids are significantly more ubiquitous and deadlier. Their widespread availability
can be traced to a short study published in the New England Journal of Medicine in
1980, which reviewed records of patients prescribed opioids while in the hospital and
found that most of those patients did not become addicted. 227 Notwithstanding its
small sample size and limited scope, this report catalyzed a change in a nearcentury’s worth of conventional wisdom that opioids should be prescribed sparingly,

223. Scholars have criticized the use of the term “epidemic” to describe previous increases
in the usage of illicit drugs, arguing that the rhetoric was deployed for political purposes rather
than to describe a medically accurate phenomenon; however, the contemporary patterns of use
of and death from opioids do in fact merit the designation. Compare Deborah Ahrens,
Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 841, 861–65
(2010) (noting extensive press coverage between 2004 and 2005 of methamphetamines and
noting that the use of the term “epidemic” did not accurately convey extent of use), and Craig
Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror: Deconstructing Drug War
Mythology, 31 SOC. JUST. 182, 187 (2004) (documenting press coverage of the crack cocaine
“epidemic” and noting that this coverage did not reflect accurate information about crack
cocaine effects), with What Is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3Y3Q-PDA2] (referring to the rapid rise in opioid-overdose deaths as an
“epidemic”); Opioid Overdose: Understanding the Epidemic, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc
/N9P8-UXX9] (same), and DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., 2015 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY, at iii (2015) (same).
224. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 1.
225. NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 1. The addictiveness and widespread
recreational use of prescription painkillers highlights the somewhat artificial distinction
between “medicine” and “drugs” that exists in the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA),
which permits the former but bans the latter. For an overview of the CSA’s classification
scheme, see GERALD F. UELMEN & ALEX KREIT, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAW SOURCEBOOK §§
1:1–1:16 (2017–2018 ed.).
226. See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
227. Sarah Zhang, The One-Paragraph Letter from 1980 that Fueled the Opioid Crisis,
ATLANTIC (June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/06/nejm-letteropioids/528840/ [https://perma.cc/KP2N-4WWT] (describing a small study in which a
physician and his graduate assistant claimed, from examining hospital records, that “despite
widespread use of narcotic drugs in hospitals, the development of addiction is rare in medical
patients with no history of addiction”).
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and only on an in-patient basis.228 Pharmaceutical companies, Purdue Pharma in
particular, began an aggressive marketing campaign to persuade physicians that
prescribing opioids on an out-patient basis was sound practice.229 The result of these
developments has been a high rate of opioid prescription, one that is unique to the
United States.230
Prescription opioids can quickly produce dependency and addiction.231 What is
more, a recent study found that 1 of every 550 patients started on opioid therapy died
of opioid-related causes just over two years after the first prescription. 232 This fact
led the Center for Disease Control to conclude “[w]e know of no other medication
routinely used for a nonfatal condition that kills patients so frequently.” 233
Dependency and addiction are concentrated in smaller cities and towns,
particularly in the Rust Belt.234 From 2007 to 2012, pharmaceutical companies

228. Id. This reluctance to prescribe opioids can be traced to the period immediately
preceding the passage of the Harrison Tax Act, when physicians worried about the
addictiveness of opioids. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
229. For book-length treatments of this history, see, e.g, BARRY MEIER, PAIN KILLER: A
“WONDER” DRUG’S TRAIL OF ADDICTION AND DEATH (2003); SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND
(2015).
230. See, e.g., Christina J. Hayhurst & Marcel E. Durieux, Opioid Overdose: The Price of
Tolerance, SCI. AM. (Aug. 9, 2016), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/opioidoverdose-the-price-of-tolerance [https://perma.cc/S2ZC-NX8A] (noting that Americans
represent only seven percent of the world’s opioid consuming population, yet use around 56%
of the world’s opioids); Keith Humphreys, Americans Use Far More Opioids Than Anyone
Else in the World, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/15/americans-use-far-more-opioids-than-anyone-else-in-the
-world/?utm_term=.cc650f5fe087 [https://perma.cc/9RDT-JBDT] (citing data from the
United Nations and noting that Americans are prescribed six times as many painkillers as
citizens of Portugal and France, even though those countries ensure more widespread access
to health care); America’s Addiction to Opioids: Heroin and Prescription Drug Abuse:
Hearing before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG
ABUSE (May 14, 2014), https://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities
/testimony-to-congress/2014/americas-addiction-to-opioids-heroin-prescription-drug-abuse
[https://perma.cc/PU75-A5VH] (noting that prescriptions in the United States account for
almost 100% of the world total for Vicodin and 81% for oxycodone).
231. See, e.g., Jessica Wapner, CDC Study Finds Opioid Dependency Begins Within a Few
Days of Initial Use, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 22, 2017, 5:41 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/cdcopiate-addiction-572498 [https://perma.cc/8LHU-Z3PT] (“Even at relatively low doses and
low duration of opioid use, the risk of long-term use and dependency begins to escalate very
early on.”).
232. Id. (noting that the proportion was as high as 1 in 32 among patients receiving high
doses).
233. Thomas R. Frieden & Debra Houry, Reducing the Risks of Relief — The CDC’s
Opioid-Prescribing Guideline, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1501, 1503 (2016).
234. Nicole Colson, Prescribing Crisis, JACOBIN (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.jacobinmag
.com/2017/04/opioid-crisis-addiction-workers-pharmaceuticals-trump
[https://perma.cc
/CS85-85LE] (noting the epidemic in the Rust Belt, connecting it to “decades of economic
decline, population loss, infrastructure decay, and declining living standards”); see also
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Drug Overdose Deaths (2016), https://www.cdc
.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/AN7C-5DF2] (noting that in 2016,
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shipped more than 780 million doses of hydrocodone and oxycodone to West
Virginia—approximately 433 pain pills for every person in the state. 235 Nearly half
the working-age men who are out of the labor force are taking pain medication,
primarily opioids.236 Likely because of a historic reluctance of physicians to
prescribe necessary pain medication to Black people,237 the initial wave of fatal
overdoses from prescription medication mostly affected white people.238 Overdose
deaths from opioids continue to rise, and deaths from heroin and synthetic opioids
such as fentanyl now outpace those from prescription opioids.239
In addition to the obvious tragic human cost of overdose-related deaths, opioid
addiction and overdose place tremendous strain on the social safety net. Recent years
have seen a spike in emergency room visits for symptoms relating to opioid addiction
withdrawal.240 From 1997 to 2011, the number of people seeking treatment for
addiction went up 900%,241 with demand dramatically exceeding supply. 242 After

the states with the highest rates of death due to drug overdose were West Virginia (52 per
100,000), Ohio (39.1 per 100,000), New Hampshire (39 per 100,000), the District of Columbia
(38.8 per 100,000) and Pennsylvania (37 per 100,000)).
235. Colson, supra note 234.
236. Anne Case & Angus Deaton, Mortality and Morbidity in the 21st Century,
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 397, 433 (2017); see also Alex Hollingsworth,
Christopher J. Ruhm & Kosali Simon, Macroeconomic Conditions and Opioid Abuse (Nat’l.
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23192, 2017) (noting macroeconomic
conditions and arguing that “[w]ith the increased availability of prescription opioids (and
reductions in heroin prices), it seems likely that consumption of these drugs rise when
economic conditions worsen and that some of this increased use leads to adverse outcomes
including emergency department visits or death”).
237. Steven Ross Johnson, The Racial Divide in the Opioid Epidemic, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160227
/MAGAZINE/302279871 [https://perma.cc/N36L-M5F3] (stating that doctors prescribe
opiates to blacks less frequently due to racial bias and quoting the director of Physicians for
Responsible Opioid Prescribing as saying, “It would appear that the prescriber may be more
concerned about the possibility of the patient getting addicted or maybe the possibility that the
pills will be diverted and sold on the street if the patient is black. If the patient is white, they
may feel like there’s nothing to worry about . . . .”); see also Kelly K. Dineen, Addressing
Prescription Opioid Abuse Concerns in Context: Synchronizing Policy Solutions to Multiple
Complex Public Health Problems, 40 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 20 (2016) (“Disparities in pain
treatment also reflect ingrained biases based on gender, race, socioeconomic status, and other
perceived differences.”).
238. Lopez, supra note 22 (noting that while white Americans still die disproportionately
from opioid overdose-related deaths, the gap between whites and other racial groups is
narrower with heroin and other illicit forms of the drug than for prescription drugs).
239. Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Aug. 2018), https://
www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates [https://perma.cc
/QK6N-2K4K].
240. Alexander et al., supra note 2, at 560.
241. Id.
242. Christine Vestal, Still Not Enough Treatment in the Heart of the Opioid Crisis, PEW
CHARITABLE TRS. (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis
/blogs/stateline/2016/09/26/still-not-enough-treatment-in-the-heart-of-the-opioid-crisis
[https://perma.cc/U986-4XZ8] (citing government data showing “less than half of the 2.2
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years of declining numbers, the child welfare population has increased by ten percent
between 2012 and 2016 in conjunction with the worsening opioid crisis.243 Children
removed from opioid abusers, often after the latter are arrested, face longer stays in
foster care and require expensive long-term therapy and treatment.244 Morgues have
run out of space for the bodies of people who died from opioids.245 Experts estimate
that the economic cost of opioid misuse has been $500 billion per year, comprising
lost productivity, additional spending on health care and social services, and criminal
justice costs.246
B. Addressing the Harms and Costs of Arrest
The ubiquity and lethality of today’s opioid crisis have created space for a new
law enforcement approach to alleged drug users. This approach has been shaped by
advocates with social and political capital; some of its most effective advocates are
the white and upper-middle-class friends and family members of people with opioid
addiction.247 They have pushed for a less punitive set of tactics and strategies in part

million people who need treatment for opioid addiction are receiving it”).
243. Angie Schwartz & Sean Hughes, On Child Welfare, an Insufficient Federal Response
to the Opioid Epidemic, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (Apr. 24, 2018), https://chronicle
ofsocialchange.org/opinion/child-welfare-insufficient-federal-opioid-epidemic [https://perma
.cc/2DRJ-6CQR].
244. Perry Stein & Lindsey Bever, The Opioid Crisis Is Straining the Nation’s Foster-Care
Systems, WASH. POST (July 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-opioid
-crisis-is-straining-the-nations-foster-care-systems/2017/06/30/97759fb2-52a1-11e7-91eb
-9611861a988f_story.html?utm_term=.0dcf22bc1f00 [https://perma.cc/4R5X-K5RJ]; see
also Paula Seligson & Tim Reid, Unbudgeted: How the Opioid Crisis Is Blowing a Hole in
Small-Town America’s Finances, REUTERS (Sept. 27, 2017, 12:17 PM), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-usa-opioids-budgets/unbudgeted-how-the-opioid-crisis-is-blowing-a-hole-in
-small-town-americas-finances-idUSKCN1BU2LP [https://perma.cc/JL68-QVAN] (noting
that in Ross County, Ohio, about seventy-five percent of the 200 children placed into state
care in the county have parents with opioid addictions, up from about forty percent five years
ago, and that this development has caused a near doubling in the county’s child services
budget).
245. Tim Craig & Nicole Lewis, As Opioid Overdose Exacts a Higher Price, Communities
Ponder Who Should Be Saved, WASH. POST (July 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/as-opioid-overdoses-exact-a-higher-price-communities-ponder-who-should-be
-saved/2017/07/15/1ea91890-67f3-11e7-8eb5-cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html?utm_term=
.60ab1f17c319 [https://perma.cc/FF2Q-D5CX].
246. Maria LaMagna, More Evidence that the Opioid Epidemic Is Only Getting Worse,
MARKETWATCH (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-much-the-opioid
-epidemic-costs-the-us-2017-10-27 [https://perma.cc/GC5T-ND3X].
247. A recently enacted federal statute reflects the more compassionate, treatment-oriented
approach to the opioid crisis. The 2016 law provides for expanded access to naloxone among
civilians as well as law enforcement, encourages awareness-raising around the misuse of
opioid-based pain medication, and directs the Department of Justice to fund state and local
initiatives that expand treatment alternatives to incarceration. See generally PHYSICIANS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 7 (describing law and explaining change in political
environment).
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by emphasizing that addiction and overdose-related deaths occur across all races and
socioeconomic classes.248
A new mantra has emerged: “we can’t arrest our way out of this” is now a
common assertion by law enforcement officials at the local, state, and federal
levels.249 This statement likely indicates several things: first, that police officers can
neither regulate nor reach the many drivers of the opioid crisis. These include overprescription by doctors,250 “pill mills,”251 improper marketing by pharmaceutical

248. Yankah, supra note 26.
249. See, e.g., Caroline Preston, Don’t Lock ’Em Up. Give ’Em a Chance to Quit Drugs,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/opinion/dont-lock-em-up
-give-em-a-chance-to-quit-drugs.html [https://perma.cc/954Z-M94W] (quoting Albany police
chief, Brendan Cox: “We can’t keep arresting our way out of problems . . . . Isn’t that the
definition of insanity — that you continue to do the same thing over and over and expect a
different result?”); Charles Crumm, Deadly Addiction: ‘Can’t Arrest Our Way Out of This,’
OAKLAND PRESS NEWS (July 21, 2017), http://www.theoaklandpress.com/general
-news/20170721/deadly-addiction-cant-arrest-our-way-out-of-this [https://perma.cc/U7U5
-MMHM] (quoting Mike Bouchard, Oakland County Sheriff); Carol Robidoux, NH Top
Cops: ‘We Can’t Arrest Our Way Out’ of Oxy, Heroin Epidemic, MANCHESTER INK LINK, (Oct.
11, 2014), https://manchesterinklink.com/nh-top-cops-cant-arrest-way-oxy-heroin-epidemic
[https://perma.cc/C5VK-RGQN] (quoting Derry, New Hampshire, Police Chief, Ed Garone);
Steve Birr, Comey Says US ‘Cannot Arrest Our Way Out of’ Opioid Epidemic, DAILY CALLER
(Mar. 2, 2017, 5:07 PM) http://dailycaller.com/2017/03/02/comey-says-us-cannot-arrest-ourway-out-of-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/HE9F-LQP7] (quoting James Comey).
250. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 13, at 486 (arguing that “while criminal law certainly has
its place in this epidemic, for example by targeting physicians who unlawfully abuse their
prescriptions pads, prescription painkiller abuse is better handled by changes to how we
regulate our healthcare system, in terms of both delivery and payment”); Erica Trachtman,
Note, A Horrific Violation of Trust: Prosecuting Doctors for Patients’ Prescription
Overdoses, AM. CRIM. L. REV. (2012), http://www.americancriminallawreview
.com/aclr-online/horrific-violation-trust-prosecuting-doctors-patients-prescription-overdoses
[https://perma.cc/L2PQ-FYAD] (stating the DEA “reports a steady rise in successful criminal
prosecutions of physicians, from just 15 convictions in 2003 to 43 in 2008”); see also Barack
Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130 HARV. L. REV. 811,
859 (2017) (detailing efforts of Obama Administration).
251. See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1119 (2014) (surveying individual and
class action lawsuits, parens patriae lawsuits initiated by state attorneys general, and criminal
prosecutions against pharmaceutical companies, prescribing physicians, and pharmacists;
concluding that state attorneys generals’ suits have been the most effective; but arguing that
litigation will be insufficient as a means to address the harms of overprescription and
suggesting instead to use comprehensive prescription monitoring programs, anti-doctor
shopping laws, and prescription drug “take back” initiatives).

2019]

OPIOI D P O LI CI NG

425

companies,252 insufficient monitoring by pharmacies,253 and illegal importation of
synthetic fentanyl.254 Second, some departments recognize that fear of arrest can
deter or delay users from seeking help for someone they are with who is
overdosing255—which can result in death.256 Third, the fact that so many white
people, including upper and middle-upper-class white people,257 are addicted to
opioids surely influences the sense among police departments that arrest is an
inappropriate response.258
Law enforcement officials know that their first encounter with a person misusing
opioids frequently involves a response to a 911 call reporting an overdose, and that
the opioid user may die without quick and life-saving action.259 Many people using

252. See Alana Semuels, Are Pharmaceutical Companies To Blame for the Opioid
Epidemic?, ATLANTIC (June 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017
/06/lawsuit-pharmaceutical-companies-opioids/529020
[https://perma.cc/746M-RHV9]
(surveying recent lawsuits by attorneys general); see also Art Van Zee, The Promotion and
Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 221, 224 (2009) (noting that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was limited
in its oversight of the marketing and promotion of controlled drugs).
253. Ausness, supra note 251, at 1121.
254. See SEAN O’CONNOR, U.S.-CHINA ECON. AND SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, FENTANYL:
CHINA’S DEADLY EXPORT TO THE UNITED STATES 6 (2017) (“Chemical flows from China have
helped fuel a fentanyl crisis in the United States . . . . Unlike previous opioid epidemics,
including a temporary spike in U.S. fentanyl use in 2006 that was traced to a single clandestine
lab in Mexico, fentanyl sold in the United States is now being processed by many individual
distributors across the country. The diffused nature of the problem has made it difficult for
law enforcement to contain.”).
255. This fear is likely to become more pronounced as more states enact and prosecutors
enforce laws that make people who supply illicit drugs that lead to death eligible for homicide
charges. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH & CASEY ANDERSON, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, OPIOIDS:
TREATING AN ILLNESS, ENDING A WAR (2017), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp
-content/uploads/2017/12/Opioids-Treating-an-Illness-Ending-a-War.pdf?eType=EmailBlast
Content&eId=059ccf35-73cd-412d-a1a1-6c0006c4a5b2 [https://perma.cc/T7KN-X39R].
256. In recognition of the opioid overdose crisis, nearly all states have enacted “Good
Samaritan” laws, which permit or mandate legal amnesty for individuals who themselves
would otherwise be exposed to criminal liability when they seek emergency assistance for
people using drugs. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, DRUG OVERDOSE IMMUNITY
AND GOOD SAMARITAN LAWS (June 5, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal
-justice/drug-overdose-immunity-good-samaritan-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/8HRV-SXSV].
257. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text.
258. Scholars argue that along with derogation of people of color, preferential treatment of
white Americans helps drive the stark disparities that define America’s criminal justice
system. See, e.g., Robert J. Smith, Justin D. Levinson & Zoë Robinson, Implicit White
Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871 (2015) (citing examples
including the comparatively benign response to the methamphetamine epidemic as compared
with the crack epidemic).
259. Margaret Talbot, The Addicts Next Door, NEW YORKER (June 5 & 12, 2017),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/06/05/the-addicts-next-door [https://perma.cc
/97XV-DV99]. Officers today routinely carry the overdose-reversal medication naloxone.
Opioid Overdose Reversal with Naloxone (Narcan, Evzio), NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (Apr.
2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/opioid-overdose-reversal-naloxone-narcan
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opioids purchase and use them in their own homes or cars; they escape the police
surveillance that would occur if they needed to purchase drugs in public spaces.260
The lethality of contemporary opioid use exists in part because of ignorance among
users about the contents of the drugs they are using.261 Without knowing, for
example, if the heroin they are purchasing contains fentanyl, people are likely to use
a more potent and frequently deadly amount.262 Unlike such countries as Belgium
and Portugal, nowhere in the United States are there free, anonymous drug-purity
testing services, which could provide this potentially life-saving information.263
Much of what officers do in areas where the opioid crisis is the most severe is
akin to social work—making referrals to treatment, providing grief counseling, and
managing the removal of children from parents who have overdosed.264 As the
following section demonstrates, many departments have begun to move away from
providing these services on an ad hoc basis and instead systematically to shape
officers’ discretion toward non-arrest mechanisms for responding to alleged druglaw offenders.
C. Shaping Police Discretion
Officers have broad discretion when deciding how to handle the myriad situations
they encounter during a shift: obvious and serious violations of the criminal law that
require arrest; acts that are criminal but that an officer may decide to respond to with
a citation or warning rather than an arrest; and non-criminal issues—a mentally ill
person not taking her medication or a person under the influence of drugs or alcohol
and not acting in ways perceived as rational—that may nonetheless present as public
safety problems and thus within the purview of law enforcement. 265 While the crack

-evzio [https://perma.cc/B6S8-CE85]; see also Craig & Lewis, supra note 245 (noting that,
according to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, thirty-eight states have implemented naloxone
programs for police officers).
260. Ron Meyers, How the Opioid Boom Transformed Policing: We’re Not Just Making
Arrests - We’re Caretakers, VOX (Mar. 30, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/first
-person/2017/3/30/15115066/opioid-epidemic-heroin-crisis-ohio-police
[https://perma.cc
/TSY3-3QT3] (quoting police chief in Chillicothe, Ohio, stating of the opioid crisis that “[i]t’s
also a much more invisible addiction compared to drug booms of the past. People are shooting
up in the privacy of their homes or cars”).
261. Carl L. Hart, People Are Dying Because of Ignorance, Not Because of Opioids, SCI.
AM. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/people-are-dying-because
-of-ignorance-not-because-of-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/7QFH-T4QT].
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Katie Zezima, As Opioid Overdoses Rise, Police Officers Become Counselors,
Doctors and Social Workers, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/national/as-opioid-overdoses-rise-police-officers-become-counselors-doctors-and-social
-workers/2017/03/12/85a99ba6-fa9c-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=
.21cb862ff5da [https://perma.cc/J4AT-QVDX] (“The nation’s opioid epidemic is changing
the way law enforcement does its job, with police officers acting as drug counselors and
medical workers and shifting from law-and-order tactics to approaches more akin to social
work.”).
265. Beckett, supra note 29, at 78 (noting that police officers “routinely encounter both
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cocaine crisis of the 1980s and 1990s resulted in large numbers of arrests of drug
users, such a result was not inevitable. It was, instead, the result of deliberate policy
choices flowing from state and federal incentives.266
Competing theories about discretion—how to police, how much to police, and the
proper aims of policing267—have preoccupied policymakers and scholars since the
American Bar Foundation “discovered” the concept in the 1950s.268 Shaping police
discretion involves not only forbidding certain acts but also providing guidance to
officers as to which one from among several permissible options is most
appropriate.269
In the wake of grassroots activism,270 criticism from scholars,271 and successful
class-action lawsuits,272 some police departments have slowly begun to reconsider
the deployment of discretion toward encouraging arrest for minor criminal offenses,
including drug offenses.273 The police killings of Eric Garner and Michael Brown—

non-criminal situations and serious public safety problems, both of which require considerable
judgment beyond the application of criminal law”); Stoughton, supra note 81, at 611 (noting
the wide variety of tasks officers perform).
266. Beckett, supra note 29, at 81.
267. See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 41, at 762 (noting that questions about police discretion
“depend on empirical assessments, theoretical interpretations, and normative judgments that
are widely contested”).
268. Wesley G. Skogan, Preface, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 6(2004)
(noting that while practitioners always knew discretion was an important component of
policing, researchers had not previously focused on it); see also JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE
WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 72–74 (1966) (discussing
police discretion).
269. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1950–1990 23 (1993) (“[C]ontrolling discretion is usually not a matter of
simply forbidding something; it is more often a matter of encouraging officers to choose one
option over another.”); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1133 (2000)
(defining discretion).
270. For the policy demands of leaders of the Black Lives Matter Movement, see End
Broken Windows Policing, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.joincampaignzero.org/broken
windows [https://perma.cc/46HY-DM4E].
271. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING (2001); Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the
NYPD’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
813 (2007).
272. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding
discriminatory intent in NYPD practices, including the department’s “stop and frisk”
practices).
273. See, e.g., Al Baker, J. David Goodman & Benjamin Mueller, Beyond the Chokehold:
The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com
/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html
[https://perma.cc
/RW4K-SRLL] (detailing the death of Eric Garner and noting that it occurred as a result of the
“broken-windows” policing strategy of the New York Police Department employed at the
time); Tierney Sneed, From Ferguson to Staten Island, Questions About Broken Window
Policing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 14, 2014, 6:30 PM) (“[T]he instances of unarmed,
black men getting shot and killed under debatable circumstances have put new scrutiny on a
police tactic known as ‘broken windows,’ in which law enforcement officers focus on rooting
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both of which occurred in the context of broken-windows policing—illustrate the
potential deadliness of the tactics. 274 Because the linchpin of the argument for
broken-windows policing has been undermined by precipitous drops in crime in
municipalities where it featured most prominently, even some conservative
commentators have joined the critique.275
The reconsideration of broken-windows policing is apparent in the 2015 Final
Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Report).276 It argues
for building trust and legitimacy as “the foundational principle [of] the nature of
relations between law enforcement agencies and the communities they serve.”277 In
particular, the Report exhorts law enforcement agencies to “consider adopting
preferences for seeking ‘least harm’ resolutions, such as diversion programs or
warnings and citations in lieu of arrest for minor infractions.” 278 This exhortation
reflects the groundswell of activism against the racially disproportionate deployment
of this kind of policing. 279
Historically, officers have sometimes looked the other way when confronted with
illegal drugs—often because the suspected offender was a person with perceived
social capital, typically white and middle or upper-middle class.280 What the Report
does is recommend institutionalizing and systematizing individual diversionary
practices officers long have employed.281
The evolution in the policing of drug users urged by the Report and seen in the
current opioid crisis reflects a shift from the warrior mindset of the War on Drugs to
one that “prioritizes service over crime fighting.”282 For some time, policing scholars

out minor disorder as a way to prevent more serious crime.”).
274. See generally K. Babe Howell, The Costs of “Broken Windows” Policing: Twenty
Years and Counting, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1059, 1061 (2016) (“[E]very police encounter that
arises out of a minor offense has the potential to end in tragedy, making unnecessary policing
under zero-tolerance policies dangerous.”).
275. Kyle Smith, We Were Wrong About Stop-and-Frisk, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 1, 2018, 9:40
PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/01/new-york-city-stop-and-frisk-crime-decline
-conservatives-wrong [https://perma.cc/C2Z4-5KGJ] (acknowledging that the abandonment
of broken-windows policing in New York City did not lead to an increase in crime and in fact
correlated with declining crime rates). See generally HARCOURT, supra note 271 (disputing
the empirical basis of broken-windows policing).
276. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING 43 (2015), https://cops.usdoj.gov
/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/92BA-T2UW] (“Law enforcement
agencies should consider adopting preferences for seeking ‘least harm’ resolutions, such as
diversion programs or warnings and citations in lieu of arrest for minor infractions.”).
277. Id. at 1.
278. Id. at 3.
279. Akbar, supra note 44, at 418–20.
280. Tammy Rinehart Kochel, David B. Wilson & Stephen D. Mastrofski, Effect of Suspect
Race on Officers’ Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473 (2011); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
UNITES STATES - PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE: RACIALLY DISPROPORTIONATE DRUG ARRESTS,
(2000) (arguing that “drug offending whites have been disproportionately free from arrest
compared to blacks”).
281. See PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, supra note 276.
282. Seth Stoughton, Law Enforcement’s “Warrior” Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 225,
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have argued for such a shift toward what they refer to as a “guardian” mentality, 283
in which citizen-officer interactions are characterized by mutual respect. 284
Observing the on-the-ground reality of police work in the opioid crisis, one
commentator hints at the opportunism that may lie below the surface of the changes
observable in opioid policing: “If there’s anything that could change the perception
that law enforcement officers have moved from protecting and serving to soldiering
and bullying, it just might be the opioid epidemic raging across the United States.” 285
This on-the-ground reality, along with recent political and scholarly currents, have
combined such that police departments can recognize in the complaint of police
officers—“we can’t arrest our way out of this”—the need for a new approach. Opioid
policing constitutes an effort to systemically shape discretion to reflect a normative
position for officers—that they shouldn’t arrest their way out of drug possessory
offenses.286
D. New Practices
In a small but growing number of jurisdictions, police departments have
systematized the deployment of discretion toward a non-arrest mindset. The first
approach, discussed in subsection one, is a program that encourages officers to refer
low-level alleged offenders to community-based services, avoiding jail and
prosecution.287 The second form of opioid policing, discussed in subsection two,

231 (2015).
283. Bell, supra note 126, at 2148 (citations omitted). Recent popular press suggests the
popularity of the notion. See, e.g., Kimberly Kindy, Creating Guardians, Calming Warriors,
WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative
/2015/12/10/new-style-of-police-training-aims-to-produce-guardians-not-warriors/?utm
_term=.3ee45f0f1935 [https://perma.cc/4UT7-T3WG]; Kate Mather, LAPD Urges Officers to
Be Community Guardians, Not Warriors on Crime, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015, 4:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/la-me-warrior-guardians-20150821-story.html [https://
perma.cc/V822-CLUU]; Nick Morgan, From Warriors to Guardians, MAIL TRIB. (Mar. 4,
2016),
http://mailtribune.com/news/crime-courts-emergencies/from-warriors-to-guardians
[https://perma.cc/9HT7-BN9J].
284. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between Lawful
or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why It Matters, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1865, 1878 (2013) (noting that “lawfulness” and “efficiency” are the two predominant
mechanisms by which to evaluate policing but arguing that this binary is overly restrictive and
urging instead that officers comport themselves “in ways that confer dignity on those with
whom they interact and otherwise treat people with respect”).
285. Arthur Rizer & Carrie Wade, The Opioid Epidemic Is Changing Law Enforcement,
NEWSDAY (Sept. 28, 2017, 11:56 AM), https://www.newsday.com/opinion/commentary/the
-opioid-epidemic-is-changing-law-enforcement-1.14293926 [https://perma.cc/U3GV-5DP2].
286. See generally Harmon, supra note 41, at 317 (arguing that arrests should promote
important social aims and that the costs of arrests should be broadly proportionate to the ends
they serve).
287. The primary sources of information about the first version of opioid policing are
materials created and published by the organizations that created these programs, as well as
media accounts of their successes. In addition, two evaluations have been conducted of the
first form of opioid policing. See Beckett, supra note 29 (process and outcome evaluation);
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allows individuals to receive priority access to a detoxification program in exchange
for relinquishment of their illicit drugs. 288
1. Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion
After years of litigation initiated by racial justice advocates over racially
disproportionate War on Drugs policing, community stakeholders in Seattle
convened in 2011 to address their shared perception that change was needed. 289 Drug
sale and use were rampant, and individuals cycled in and out of the criminal system—
serving short sentences and receiving no resources to assist with addressing the issues
that may have brought them to the attention of the police in the first place. 290 Out of
these convenings, law enforcement officials, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and
those community members identified as public safety leaders designed the Law
Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program. 291
LEAD contains two distinct components. The first is a pre-booking diversion
program for people who could otherwise be arrested for violations of drug or
prostitution laws.292 Prostitution crimes are included because of data indicating that
women who are dependent on drugs are more likely to come to the attention of police
for that offense than for drug offenses.293 In this first version of LEAD, an officer

SEEMA L. CLIFASEFI & SUSAN E. COLLINS, LEAD PROGRAM EVALUATION: DESCRIBING LEAD
CASE MANAGEMENT IN PARTICIPANTS’ OWN WORDS (2016) (qualitative social science
evaluation). For a list of all jurisdictions replicating all or some of the LEAD elements, see
LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, https://www.leadbureau.org [https://perma.cc/6KGP
-EHY8].
288. No evaluations of this second form of opioid policing exist in the legal literature. For
a short evaluation of the program’s placement rate, see Davida M. Schiff, Mari-Lynn Drainoni,
Megan Bair-Merritt, Zoe Weinstein & David Rosenbloom, A Police-Led Addiction Treatment
Referral Program in Massachusetts, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2502 (Dec. 22, 2016).
289. Beckett, supra note 29, at 86.
290. Id. at 93.
291. Id. at 86.
292. Diversion from formal criminal justice system processing typically involves five
goals: avoidance of negative labeling, reduction of unnecessary social control, reduction of
recidivism, reduction of justice system costs, and provision of service. CTR. OF JUVENILE &
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WIDENING THE NET IN JUVENILE JUSTICE AND THE DANGERS OF PREVENTION
AND EARLY INTERVENTION 3 (Aug. 2001). While diversion exists in the criminal system,
typically it is a process dependent on prosecutors after arrest or judges after adjudication,
rather than on police officers. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.02A (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final
Draft 2017) (defining deferred prosecution as “the practice of declining to pursue charges
against an individual believed to have committed a crime in exchange for completion of
specified conditions”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.02B (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2017) (defining deferred adjudication as “any practice that conditionally disposes of a criminal
case prior to the entry of a judgment of conviction”).
293. Sara Jean Green, LEAD Program for Low-Level Drug Criminals Sees Success,
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015, 11:05 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news
/crime/lead-program-for-low-level-drug-criminals-sees-success
[https://perma.cc/9QT4
-ANBB] (“While men are more likely to be arrested for using or selling drugs, women
involved with drugs are most often arrested for prostitution, which made the misdemeanor
offense also a qualifying crime for participation in LEAD.”).
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makes an arrest, transports the arrestee to the precinct, and contacts a LEAD case
manager for an initial screening; the officer typically relinquishes custody of the
referred person upon the caseworker’s arrival. 294 The arresting officer sends the
arrest record to the misdemeanor or felony prosecutor—these offices maintain the
records and the authority to charge the arrested person. However, the presumption is
that charges will not be filed if the individual completes both the initial screening as
well as a full intake assessment with LEAD case managers within thirty days of the
referral.295
The second component is aimed not at situations in which probable cause exists
for arrest but at individuals believed by police officers to be at risk of future arrest.296
This so-called “social-contact” component of LEAD enables officers to target people
believed to engage in drug-related crime, or sex work, within the program’s
catchment areas.297 Added at the request of police officers, 298 the social-contact
component expands the scope of the program beyond one that is strictly created for
diversion. LEAD architects view the social-contact component as critical to ensuring
and maintaining buy-in from officers who are part of the program. 299 Without the
ability proactively to engage people believed to be involved in criminal activity,
LEAD proponents presumably believe officers will otherwise ignore the relevant
policy directives.300
In order to participate in either version of LEAD, an alleged offender must meet
certain eligibility criteria.301 Typically, anyone suspected of a low-level drug or
prostitution offense is eligible.302 While the sale of a small amount of drugs is not an
automatic disqualifier, program administrators must believe that the sale was for
subsistence or to support a drug habit, rather than to make a profit.303 A prior criminal
record of serious or violent offenses presumptively disqualifies a person. 304 A final
eligibility criterion is “amenab[ility] to diversion.”305 This phrase is not defined in

294. Id.
295. Professor Katherine Beckett, who conducted a process evaluation of LEAD as well as
an outcome evaluation, states that the LEAD stakeholders report that prosecutors have
complied with this expectation. Beckett, supra note 29, at 90.
296. Id. at 92.
297. As of 2013, these “social-contact referrals” can only be made for individuals with
prior documented involvement in drugs (possession or selling) or prostitution. See Beckett,
supra note 29, at 90, 96.
298. CLIFASEFI & COLLINS, supra note 287, at 4.
299. LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR POLICING ROLE (2017),
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/6f124f_05aef9c2db0b4c1db815cac96e54368b.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7GH-B7DS].
300. CLIFASEFI & COLLINS, supra note 287, at 4–5.
301. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, Program Profile: Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion
(LEAD) Program (Seattle, Washington), CRIME SOLUTIONS (July 11, 2016), https://www
.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=477 [https://perma.cc/7VJ9-EFTX].
302. Id. (noting that people suspected of exploiting minors, possessing an amount of drugs
exceeding three grams, or promoting prostitution are ineligible).
303. CLIFASEFI &. COLLINS, supra note 287, at 7.
304. Id. (listing prior criminal convictions that presumptively render people ineligible).
305. Id. The jurisdictions certified by LEAD have similar caveats for admission to the
program. See id. at 18–19.
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the program literature and its interpretation appears entirely to be left to program
administrators.
LEAD participants have access to a panoply of social services.306 Case managers
work closely with LEAD-involved individuals to assist them in attaining housing, a
job or job training, other community services, and treatment. 307 They also offer
personal encouragement and support—all with an aim of staying out of the criminal
system.308 If LEAD participants are arrested for a subsequent alleged offense,
officers and prosecutors are encouraged to coordinate with LEAD case managers and
social workers in lieu of initiating criminal proceedings. 309 Assuming the LEAD
team believes participants are making progress toward the goal and can convince the
prosecutor of the same, criminal proceedings will not ensue. 310
Initially developed as a pilot project, LEAD is now a permanent part of Seattle
policing, receiving approximately $1 million in public funding.311 Approximately
twenty additional jurisdictions have replicated LEAD.312 Dozens more have
developed pilot projects or are exploring other forms of diversion. 313 In 2016, the
National Institute of Justice rated LEAD a “promising” program.314 The presidential
election does not appear to have dampened federal enthusiasm for LEAD; the

306. LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, supra note 299.
307. Id. (“Case managers will link diverted individuals to housing, vocational and
educational opportunities, treatment, mental and other health services, and community
services.”).
308. LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES FOR SUCCESSFUL LEAD
IMPLEMENTATION (2017), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/6f124f_552d331f637f436189a38d1
4f9b823ad.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5X3-U7DL] (“The goal should be to address the
participant’s drug activity and any other factors driving his/her problematic behavior – even if
abstinence from drug use is not achieved – and to build long-term relationships with
participants without employing coercion or shame.”).
309. LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, LEAD FACT SHEET, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd
/6f124f_535679d78c2541fdaf433d3983cb2a31.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UG4-RHXJ].
310. Green, supra note 293 (describing this philosophy and explaining that “[i]f LEAD
participants backslide or commit new felony drug crimes, they are held accountable. But
because police and prosecutors are familiar with their life situations, they are able to use their
discretion so as not to interrupt the progress being made. For instance, the [King County senior
deputy prosecutor] may not write an arrest warrant for someone if she knows that person has
an upcoming appointment to get into stable housing”). For the impact that this coordinated
approach may have on subsequent re-arrest rates, see infra note 357 and accompanying text.
311. Kelsey Hamlin, Seattle Sorting Out How to Pay for Expansion of Drug Diversion
Program Beyond Capitol Hill, CAPITOL HILL SEATTLE BLOG (Nov. 9, 2017),
http://www.capitolhillseattle.com/2017/11/seattle-sorting-out-how-to-pay-for-expansion-of
-drug-diversion-program-beyond-capitol-hill [https://perma.cc/U76M-FYMJ].
312. LEAD NATIONAL SUPPORT BUREAU, https://www.leadbureau.org/ [https://perma.cc
/XFQ7-7MX6].
313. Id.
314. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 301. For Obama White House July 2015 national
convening on the LEAD program, and praise of the program in a White House blog post, see
Roy L Austin, LEAD-ing the Way to a More Efficient Criminal Justice System, OBAMA WHITE
HOUSE (July 2, 2015, 5:54 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2015/07/02/leading-way-more-efficient-criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/V5JD-TES7].
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President allocated $2.5 million for LEAD expansion in 2017. 315 While a
comparatively small amount when contrasted with earlier funding for War on Drugs
programs, the continued funding for the program at any level is notable given the
otherwise tough-on-crime rhetoric issuing from the Department of Justice.316
2. Legal Amnesty and Drug Detoxification
The second form of opioid policing is a program that promises drug-addicted
users priority access to a detoxification program and a commitment not to arrest or
initiate criminal proceedings in exchange for their voluntary relinquishment of illicit
drugs and paraphernalia. Known as the Angel Initiative, it began in 2015 in
Gloucester, Massachusetts.
Unlike LEAD, the Angel Initiative was spurred directly by the high rate of
overdose-related deaths from opioids.317 The program is structured such that users
who walk into a police station or to an officer in the community and turn over illicit
drugs can then request immediate entry into drug detox programs. 318 On-duty officers
contact treatment centers to identify a facility with an opening; they then arrange for
transportation—by ambulance, if necessary.319 If the officer determines that the
process will take more than a few hours, they assign the drug user to a civilian who
has volunteered to provide emotional support and to wait with the person until the
program has a treatment bed.320
The ideological premises and resources of the Angel Initiative are different from
those of LEAD. The Angel Initiative focuses entirely on obtaining detoxification
treatment for users.321 It has not adopted a harm-reduction framework. It is not set up
to assist drug users with problems other than addiction. Reminiscent of drug courts,
the Angel Initiative rests on the one-dimensional notion that addiction causes
criminal behavior. As a Connecticut sheriff overseeing an Angel Initiative puts it:
“Rather than focus on arrests, if we can put 100 people in treatment, then we are
preventing crime.”322 In its structure and rhetoric, the Angel Initiative seems to
presuppose that the difficult life circumstances that frequently accompany drug
addiction—homelessness, mental health issues, and unemployment—are its result
rather than its cause or even its correlative. Presumably, once treatment is received,
the former user is expected to embark upon a law-abiding life.

315. Captain Lars Paul, Innovation Is Key in Opioid Battle, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (May
12, 2018, 4:00 PM), http://www.fayobserver.com/opinion/20180512/capt-lars-paul
-innovation-is-key-in-opioid-battle [https://perma.cc/4BN3-9ENT].
316. See infra note 444 and accompanying text.
317. Schiff et al., supra note 288.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Jesse Leavenworth, Cops Consider ‘Angel Initiative’ to Combat Heroin Scourge,
HARTFORD COURANT (Jan. 10, 2016, 7:34 AM), http://www.courant.com/health/heroin/hc
-manchester-gloucester-heroin-police-0110-20160110-story.html# [https://perma.cc/RJ8V
-WY88].
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Angel Initiatives have spread quickly; similar programs currently exist in 200
departments in twenty-eight states.323 They exist in some of the states hardest hit by
the opioid crisis, no matter the political orientation of the state’s elected leadership.324
III. THE PROMISE OF OPIOID POLICING
This Part analyzes the promise of opioid policing, identifying and exploring ways
in which the two forms improve upon both War on Drugs policing and specialized
drug courts. Section A considers the practical benefits of LEAD’s harm-reduction
framework—specifically, enabling alleged drug offenders to stay out of the criminal
system and attain personal stability—as well as the way in which both programs work
to reduce the risk of overdose. Section B summarizes recent preliminary and positive
evaluations of each of the two forms of opioid policing.
A. Toward a Public-Health Lens on Drug Crimes
1. Avoidance of Arrest
Each of the two forms of opioid policing is structured so that alleged drug
offenders have a better opportunity to avoid criminal justice involvement than they
would in either War on Drugs policing or drug courts. LEAD offers services prior to
an arrest; the alleged offender need not enter a guilty plea or be prosecuted in the
first instance, as drug court participants must.325 The Angel Initiative provides access
to medical treatment and drug detoxification upon request, and it accepts drugs and
paraphernalia without imposing criminal consequences.326
In diverting alleged offenders from the criminal system and into an array of
services, LEAD recognizes the futility and harm of arrest—apparent since the heyday
of the War on Drugs and brought into focus with the opioid crisis.327 That is, in
addition to the typical harms attendant to arrest, a person in the throes of opioid
dependence is particularly at risk from detention. 328 Similarly, as one proponent

323. See, e.g., Brian MacQuarrie, ‘Angel’ Opioid Initiative Thrives Despite Exit of
Gloucester Police Chief, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe
.com/metro/2017/02/21/angel-opioid-initiative-thrives-despite-exit-gloucester-police-chief
/hvH14GgG0dRYTXJOpGEswO/story.html [https://perma.cc/Y2JH-Q7FJ] (describing that
in 200 police agencies in twenty-eight states, departments have adopted an approach through
which people who come to the police department and ask for help for drug addiction will be
taken to a hospital and later placed in a recovery program and noting that some, but not all, of
these departments also adopt a “no-arrest” policy).
324. See, e.g., Megan Thompson, Scottsdale Helping Drug Addicts with Arizona Angel
Initiative, Not Handcuffs, ABC 15 ARIZONA (May 17, 2018, 10:38 AM), https://www
.abc15.com/news/region-northeast-valley/scottsdale/scottsdale-helping-drug-addicts-with
-arizona-angel-initiative-not-handcuffs [https://perma.cc/55PX-ZKBQ].
325. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 320–23 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text.
328. For a discussion of the harms of arrest for an opioid-addicted person, see supra notes
111–17 and accompanying text. For an analysis of collateral consequences of arrest, see
generally Harmon, supra note 41; Roberts, supra note 41.
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explains of the Angel Initiative, “It puts police in the lifesaving business instead of
the spin-drying business of arresting and releasing.”329 This program encourages
officers to see drug users not, or not only, as criminals—but instead as people
suffering from the disease of addiction.330
2. Harm Reduction over Abstinence
Harm reduction also distinguishes LEAD from the specialized drug courts.331
Recall that drug courts require participants to abstain from drugs and alcohol; failure
to do so will result in short periods of incarceration and eventually imposition of a
jail or prison sentence.332 One justification for jailing drug-court participants for
relapse is that the threat of incarceration can “propel a defendant through
treatment.”333 A harm-reduction philosophy rejects this justification as inaccurate
and misguided. Given that the rate for relapse hovers between forty and sixty
percent,334 programming for drug users should anticipate it. LEAD embodies the
notion that it is possible to reduce the harm to and by drug users without either
demanding abstinence or utilizing jail as a treatment mechanism.335
While many LEAD enrollees likely want to achieve sobriety—and may ultimately
succeed—LEAD does not insist on abstinence as a precondition for being accepted
into or remaining in the program. 336 Instead, LEAD program materials make clear

329. MacQuarrie, supra note 323 (quoting John Rosenthal, a Boston-area developer and
supporter of the Angel Initiative).
330. Danny Langloss, Jr., Reshaping the War on Drugs: A Community Based Approach
(2017),
http://paariusa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/46/2017/12/Welcome-Remarks
-Reshaping-the-War-on-Drugs-Chief-Danny-Langloss-Dixon-Illinois.pdf [https://perma.cc
/6XPG-3KWT].
331. Beckett, supra note 29, at 85 (describing harm reduction practices and principles).
332. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
333. Jan Hoffman, She Went to Jail for a Drug Relapse. Tough Love or Too Harsh?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2018) (citing Brief for Nat’l Ass’n of Drug Ct. Profs., Commonwealth v.
Eldred, 101 N.E.3d 911, 917 (Mass. 2018)).
334. NAT’L INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, DRUGS, BRAINS, AND BEHAVIOR: THE SCIENCE OF
ADDICTION,
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugs-brains-behavior.../treatment
-recovery [https://perma.cc/T6M3-7XCR].
335. What Is LEAD?, LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, https://www.leadbureau.org/about
-lead [https://perma.cc/CL9W-QH4Y] (describing LEAD as using public health framework
and employing harm reduction).
336. Id. Other forms of harm reduction for drug users include needle exchanges and safe
injection sites, where drug users can inject drugs under medical supervision. While no such
sites currently exist in the United States, Philadelphia recently approved one. Elana Gordon,
What’s Next for ‘Safe Injection’ Sites in Philadelphia?, NPR (Jan. 24, 2018, 3:43 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/01/24/580255140/whats-next-for-safe
-injection-sites-in-philadelphia [https://perma.cc/CSG6-HBKX] (quoting Dr. Thomas Farley,
Philadelphia’s health commissioner and co-chair of the city’s opioid task force, arguing
“[t]here are many people who are hesitant to go into treatment, despite their addiction, and we
don’t want them to die”); see also Leo Beletsky, Grace E. Macalino & Scott Burris, Attitudes
of Police Officers Towards Syringe Access, Occupational Needle-Sticks, and Drug Use: A
Qualitative Study of One City Police Department in the United States, 16 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y
267, 268 (2005) (noting that thirty percent of officers surveyed have been stuck by needles
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that “[p]articipants will be engaged where they are . . . they will not be penalized or
denied services if they do not achieve abstinence.”337
Since the threat of arrest works to push illicit drug users and people engaged in
sex work underground in ways that can exacerbate risk,338 a harm-reduction
paradigm conceptualizes arrest itself as a secondary harm.339 In directing
participating officers to view arrest as a “strategy of last resort for low-level drug
offenses and offenses related [to] behavioral health conditions and/or poverty,”340
LEAD evinces an awareness of the health-impairing and criminogenic nature not
only of arrest but also of prosecution and incarceration. 341
LEAD also departs from the judicial-coercion model of drug courts. 342 Its
counselors collaborate with the participant in designing a service plan that the
participant believes will work.343 LEAD case managers are trained to emphasize that
meaningful improvements may occur even in the absence of abstinence. 344 The
group’s orientation is that an active and ongoing engagement with clients,
encouragement of goal-setting, and provision of emotional and financial support as
they work toward those goals is the best way to assist a client in diminishing harm
from drug use if not ceasing it altogether.345 In this respect, LEAD departs from the
drug court notion that the disease of addiction requires treatment and that involuntary
treatment is not only appropriate but more effective than treatment voluntarily
entered. Drug courts’ single-minded focus on abstinence from all illegal drug use
belies the fact that for many users, drug addiction is not necessarily the central risk
factor or problem in their lives.346 While not explicitly engaging in the debate over

and arguing that finding as part of the reason for law enforcement support for needle
exchanges).
337. LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR CASE MANAGEMENT ROLE,
http://www.defender.org/sites/default/files/LEAD%20Core%20Principles%20for%20Case%
20Management.pdf [https://perma.cc/8GPC-V6K7].
338. Beckett, supra note 29, at 86 (noting that in efforts to avoid detection, for example,
drug users may well be more likely to inject more quickly, in darker places, or with dirty
needles, thus endangering themselves and others).
339. Id.
340. LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, supra note 299.
341. See Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423, 456
(2013).
342. One jurisdiction has developed a specialized opioid court. Located in Buffalo, New
York, the court requires daily reporting from participants for thirty consecutive days and
recognizes the likelihood of relapse and is less likely to punish it than the traditional drug
court. Nonetheless, it remains wedded to the idea that judicial coercion is effective. In any
event, the expense of the court suggests that it may be difficult to replicate. See generally
Timothy Williams, This Judge Has a Mission: Keep Defendants Alive, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/03/us/buffalo-heroin-opioid-court.html [https://
perma.cc/6BW6-X6RK] (describing the first and only “opioid court” in the United States and
noting its mission is to “keep defendants alive” rather than to ensure that addicts remain drug
free).
343. Beckett, supra note 29, at 91.
344. Id. at 92.
345. Id. at 92 n.62.
346. TIGER, supra note 45, at 29.
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how best to characterize addiction, LEAD’s agnosticism about the abstinence
imperative for drug users and inclusion of a broad range of services to address overall
well-being suggests a departure from the one-dimensional disease model on which
the drug court is founded.347
Finally, LEAD participants do not “jump the line” in front of non-LEAD
individuals waiting to access public services. This “nondisplacement principle” 348 is
aimed at ensuring equity among marginalized individuals and “increas[ing] safety
and order for the community as a whole.”349 This principle also differentiates LEAD
from drug courts, which are criticized for filling up scarce treatment placements with
court-ordered individuals who do not need or want the care, but who accept it to
avoid incarceration.350
B. On-the-Ground Results
Two recent outcome evaluations suggest that LEAD has achieved some of its
stated goals: reducing arrests and serving as a model for cost-effective social service
provision for individuals who would otherwise be processed through the criminal
legal system.351 The first study measured the recidivism rates of approximately 200
LEAD clients against a group of people with similar records who did not participate
in LEAD.352 LEAD clients were nearly sixty percent less likely to be rearrested for
additional crimes; the odds that a LEAD client was sentenced to prison in the first
year after their enrollment in LEAD were eighty-seven percent lower.353 A second

347. See Gene Heyman, Drug Addiction Is a Matter of Difficult Choices, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
10, 2014, 7:09 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/02/10/what-is-addiction
/drug-addiction-is-a-matter-of-difficult-choices [https://perma.cc/L4T8-Y9S9]; Nick Heather,
David Best, Anna Kawalek, Matt Field, Marc Lewis, Frederick Rotgers, Reinout W. Wiers &
Derek Heim, Challenging the Brain Disease Model of Addiction: European Launch of the
Addiction Theory Network, 26 ADDICTION RES. & THEORY 249, 250 (2018) (“The emergence
of a recovery paradigm has challenged the conceptualisation of addiction as a biologicallydriven phenomenon rooted in human pathology. Evidence indicates that recovery is a social
experience, occurring within social contexts which change recovery experiences at a
subjective level . . . .”); Volkow et al., supra note 157 (listing common criticisms of the disease
model).
348. The National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, which rates evidencebased, community-level crime prevention programs across the country, states that
displacement “[o]ccurs when an intervention has the effect of moving the problem in question
(such as crime) rather than producing an actual reduction in incidence” and negatively rates
programs that produce displacement on the CrimeSolutions.gov Scoring Instrument. NAT’L
INST. OF JUSTICE, Glossary, CRIME SOLUTIONS, https://www.crimesolutions.gov/Glossary
.aspx#D [https://perma.cc/N7GG-ZZKP].
349. LEAD NAT’L SUPPORT BUREAU, supra note 299.
350. PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 148, at 2; see also Bowers, supra note
148, at 787.
351. Beckett, supra note 29, at 93.
352. Id.
353. Id. LEAD clients also spent thirty-nine fewer days in jail than similarly situated
arrestees who did not enter LEAD. But see NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, supra note 348
(noting that while “[t]he intervention group was significantly less likely to have been arrested,
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study yielded findings suggesting what LEAD architects hypothesized; namely, that
the attainment of housing, employment, and some form of public benefits correlated
with reduction in re-arrest.354 Of course, it may be the case that the reductions in rearrest resulted only or mostly from the willingness of prosecutors not to bring charges
when they could have, rather than from an actual reduction in criminal offending.
Indeed, the Seattle group indicates a high degree of “buy-in” from prosecutors who
believe prosecution will imperil participants’ progress.355 In any event, the cost
savings from LEAD were significant. Criminal justice system costs associated with
LEAD clients decreased by roughly thirty percent relative to the year prior to their
enrollment in LEAD, while costs for non-LEAD individuals more than doubled in
that same period.356
Further, a qualitative evaluation produced similarly promising results. 357 A 2015
set of interviews with a convenience sample of thirty-two LEAD participants
revealed that all but one reported a positive experience with and perception of the
program. The characteristics most valued were the program’s client centeredness,
harm-reduction approach, and ability to follow through with commitments. In
addition, participants appreciated that the program requested input and required
involvement from them.358
Preliminary results of evaluations of the Angel Initiative suggest that the program
is succeeding in obtaining detoxification for its participants. In the first year of the
Gloucester program, 376 people entered seeking help a total of 429 times. 359 83% of
those had used opioids that day or the previous one; over 70% had injected heroin.360
Over half had previously been arrested for drug offenses. 361 In 94.5% of instances in
which a person presented for assistance and was eligible (394 of 417), direct
placement was offered.362 That placement rate exceeds those reported for hospitalbased initiatives.363

compared with the control group, at the shorter- and longer-term follow ups . . . there was no
significant impact on non-warrant arrests”).
354. Seema L. Clifasefi, Heather S. Lonczak & Susan E. Collins, Seattle’s Law
Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) Program: Within-Subjects Changes on Housing,
Employment, and Income/Benefits Outcomes and Associations with Recidivism, 63 CRIME &
DELINQ. 429, 438–39 (2017) (demonstrating that achieving housing and employment was
associated, respectively, with seventeen percent and thirty-three percent fewer arrests during
the follow-up period).
355. Beckett, supra note 29, at 93–94 (noting that prosecutors have indicated that they are
likely to file charges against LEAD clients if the behavior in question involves direct harm to
victims).
356. CLIFASEFI & COLLINS, supra note 287, at 11 (as one participant phrased it, “LEAD
helps you, but . . . I feel like I’m a part of helping also together with my counselor.” (alteration
in original)).
357. Id. at 10.
358. Id. at 9–10.
359. Schiff et. al., supra note 288.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
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A team of doctors and public-health specialists evaluating the Gloucester Angel
Initiative attributes the high placement rate to a confluence of factors, including the
motivation of participants to enter treatment, as evidenced by their coming to the
police station; the additional support provided by volunteers; the fact that officers
searched for placements twenty-four hours a day; the relationship the police
established with a local treatment center in which the majority of participants were
placed; the provision of transportation; and the state-mandated insurance in
Massachusetts, which covers drug detoxification. 364
In addition to the help provided to individuals seeking treatment, Angel Initiative
materials claim additional benefits. Namely, communities in which its approaches
are used have experienced up to a 25% reduction in crime associated with addiction,
cost savings from placing drug users into treatment rather than the criminal justice
system, and enhanced trust with community members.365 In addition, the program
costs roughly $55 per participant—significantly less than the $220 per day cost of
holding them in jail—and is financed through funds obtained pursuant to drug
seizures.366
V. THE LIMITATIONS
The foregoing analysis of the promise of opioid policing simultaneously reveals
the extent to which it remains firmly within the contours of the contemporary carceral
state. Notwithstanding their comparatively benevolent intentions, each of the two
forms of opioid policing functions to expand police surveillance. In addition, features
of the two forms re-entrench rather than disrupt the distributive inequities of race and
class that came to define War on Drugs policing. These issues are explored below.
A. Expansion of State Surveillance
Prominent political scientist Marie Gottschalk has described the late twentieth
century phenomenon in the United States of decimating welfare programs in favor
of creating law-and-order responses to social problems.367 This carceral state extends
beyond the well-documented expansion in the jail and prison population over the last
four decades; it encompasses “the far-reaching and growing range of penal
punishments and controls that lies in the never-never land between the prison gate
and full citizenship.”368 Such punishments and controls include probation, parole,
community sanctions, drug courts, and immigrant detention. The carceral state also

364. Id.
365. CAPTAIN RICHARD FLYNN, POLICE ASSISTED ADDICTION RECOVERY INITIATIVE,
ANNUAL REPORT: JUNE 2015–JUNE 2016 (2016), http://paariusa.org/wp-content/uploads
/sites/46/2016/11/PAARI-Annual-Report-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VY8-JFQX].
366. Id.
367. Marie Gottschalk, Bring It On: The Future of Penal Reform, the Carceral State, and
American Politics, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 559, 580 (2015) (examining how money ostensibly
meant to fund alternatives to incarceration is going to jail expansion and law enforcement
budgets, instead of mental health or other social services).
368. MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 1 (2014).
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extends beyond those personally affected by these consequences and includes the
more than eight million children who have had an incarcerated parent and whose life
outcomes are negatively affected by that fact.369 Carceral-state practices also
influence electoral politics, as six million people are disenfranchised either
temporarily or permanently because of a criminal conviction.370 School districts
increasingly rely on the terminology and tactics of the carceral state, employing
exclusionary discipline as well as arrest for in-school misbehavior that in the past
would have been handled within the school.371 As Jonathan Simon summarizes,
“[t]he carceral state exercises permanent surveillance and control, not a single game
of guilt or innocence.”372
Each of the two forms of opioid policing, in different ways, functions to expand
the police and prosecutorial surveillance that are hallmarks of the carceral state.
Consider first the phenomenon of net widening, in which programs targeted for a
limited population instead grow to encompass broader populations, thus losing their
effectiveness.373 Specifically, efforts at reducing the arrests, detention, and
incarceration of both juveniles and adults can often instead result in an increased
overall number of people within the system. In San Francisco in the late 1990s, for
example, the city received an unprecedented infusion of state and federal money
designed to establish a new centralized intake system to assess and refer youths to
community-based services, thereby reducing its long-established overreliance on
custodial detention.374 Despite lowered rates of crime and a shrinking youth
population, however, the number of youths in detention did not decrease. 375 Instead,
a group of lower-risk young people who might not have otherwise been charged at
all were swept into the system, and the population of the city’s juvenile detention
halls remained steady.376
The “social-contact” component of LEAD—whereby police officers are
empowered and even encouraged to reach beyond arrest situations to individuals
believed to be heavy drug users, whether or not they are engaged in a criminal
activity at the time377—could implicate net-widening concerns. If LEAD officers
confine their activities to situations in which they would otherwise arrest, then the
program can truly be said to be keeping people who would otherwise be in the
criminal legal system out of it. The social-contact component, however, potentially
complicates this claim. Police officers who seek out and accost people whom they

369. Id.
370. Id. at 2.
371. Barbara Fedders, The Anti-Pipeline Collaborative, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565,
567–75 (2016).
372. Jonathan Simon, Racing Abnormality, Normalizing Race: The Origins of America’s
Peculiar Carceral State and Its Prospects for Democratic Transformation Today, 111 NW. U.
L. REV. 1625, 1642 (2017).
373. Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial
Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
2063, 2071 (2002).
374. CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 292, at 3-4.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. See supra notes 299–302 and accompanying text.
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believe to be drug users without the constitutionally required reasonable suspicion
that crime is afoot378 are no longer engaged in an explicitly diversionary enterprise.
However well-intentioned their motivations, these officers have begun a process that
could result in criminal justice entanglement, whether for a drug offense or
something else.
The social-contact component of LEAD also creates problematic policing
incentives in ways that are reminiscent of drug courts. Critics argue that police
officers in jurisdictions with the putatively rehabilitative option of drug courts feel
incentivized to make arrests for low-level drug offenses.379 That is, when a drug court
is operating successfully under its own terms—providing treatment to individuals
who need it—officers can feel justified, even righteous, in aggressively policing drug
buys. The problematic aspects of the Drug War do not even appear salient when
officers can feel that they are doing social services work, which is the outcome
created in jurisdictions with drug courts. The more effective the drug court, the more
this incentive exists.380 One might legitimately worry that the benevolent aspirations
of the LEAD program may create similar incentives for officers to aggressively
police and accost individuals whom they might otherwise leave alone.
An additional problematic feature of opioid policing is the way in which it works
to monitor and control marginalized populations. Issa Kohler-Hausmann describes
this problem in a different context as “managerial justice,” arguing that in crowded,
urban misdemeanor courts, the priority of prosecutors is as much to obtain data from
arrested individuals useful for future monitoring by the state as it is to fairly prosecute
criminal charges.381 In a managerial justice regime,382 prosecutors and judges record
the fact of an encounter and rely on it at later decision points in deciding whether and
how to impose criminal consequences in the event of an individual’s subsequent
arrest.383
The Angel Initiative implicates concerns about managerial justice. One of its key
components is data collection regarding the individuals who participate.384 The stated
goal for the collection is the benign one of evaluating program effectiveness.385
Nonetheless, police departments participating in the program are able to expand their
database of potential suspects in drug and other crimes, subjecting a broader group

378. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
379. Eaglin, supra note 147, at 635 (“Drug courts left untouched enforcement of
increasingly punitive drug policies. In fact, drug courts may have incentivized police and
prosecutors to expand the number of individuals processed within the system for drug offenses
due to the well-meaning belief that the justice system would offer better treatment.”).
380. Id.
381. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 42, at 668; see also Jain, supra note 36, at 818–19, 860
(noting the regulatory function of arrest, even in the absence of conviction, overwhelmingly
and disproportionately on poor, black, and Latino individuals and communities).
382. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 42, at 644 (arguing that “marking” by way of arrest
and prosecution includes an expressive component—communication of the offender’s
diminished status to others in the social community).
383. Roberts, supra note 41, at 6.
384. See Schiff et al., supra note 288.
385. See id.

442

I N DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 94:389

to expanded surveillance and tracking than would be the case without the program. 386
Even though no conviction or arrest befalls individuals who are the subject of opioid
policing, the state nonetheless maintains oversight over their lives. This kind of state
surveillance does not typically exist for upper-middle-class users of illicit drugs.387
These users have access to private homes and cars, along with drug dealers who will
travel to them, such that they do not need to expose themselves to outdoor drug
markets to buy drugs or to police departments to obtain treatment. 388
The delivery of social services through police officers raises issues of stigma and
expertise. Feminist scholars critique the “hyperregulation” of poor women that
characterizes provision of means-tested welfare benefits in the United States.389 In
order to obtain needed benefits, poor women must undergo drug testing or
fingerprinting, for example. 390 When the drug treatment and other social services of
opioid policing are delivered through police officers, rather than hospitals, schools,
or community-based welfare offices, the receipt of the services becomes more than
stigmatized—it is explicitly criminalized. In addition, when police officers become
the primary vehicle through which the state responds to problems related to social
and economic deprivation such as drug addiction, one might reasonably expect the
response to be more punitive and controlling than if provided by a trained and

386. This form of tracking is similar to that which is possible pursuant to routine traffic
stops. See Jordan Blair Woods, Decriminalization, Police Authority, and Routine Traffic
Stops, 62 UCLA L. REV. 672, 739 (2015) (arguing that decriminalization efforts must focus
not only on sanctions but on constraining police authority and discretion and noting that traffic
stops can “pose serious dignitary and psychological harms to motorists, and especially
stigmatize motorists of particular social groups who are identified as “suspicious” based on
vague cues, such as their race/ethnicity or the neighborhoods in which they are driving”).
Scholars note that “[u]nlike full legalization, decriminalization preserves many of the punitive
features and collateral consequences of the criminal misdemeanor experience, even as it strips
defendants of counsel and other procedural protections.” Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor
Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1055 (2015).
387. Theodore J. Cicero, Matthew S. Ellis, Hilary L. Surratt & Steven P. Kurtz, The
Changing Face of Heroin Use in the United States: A Retrospective Analysis of the Past 50
Years, 7 J. AM. MED. ASS’N PSYCHIATRY 821 (2014) (discussing data showing that over the
last fifty years “heroin use has changed from an inner-city, minority-centered problem to one
that has a more widespread geographical distribution, involving primarily white men and
women in their late twenties living outside of large urban areas”); see supra note 285 and
accompanying text.
388. See supra note 260–61 and accompanying text.
389. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317 (2014).
390. See, e.g., Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of
Low-Income Women, 3 U. CAL. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 301–02, 313 (2013) (citing finger imaging
and drug testing as examples of “ceremonial degradation” policies intended to degrade welfare
recipients under the guise of process). Twitter user @nedmiller pointed out the inverse of this
phenomenon, as illustrated by President Trump’s recent plan to give billions of dollars to
farmers hurt by tariffs, stating “Midwest farmers are the new Welfare Queens. Will we drug
test them? Will we make them attend skill building classes or go get their GED?” Ned Miller
(@nedmiller), TWITTER (Aug. 5, 2018, 5:06 PM), https://twitter.com/nedmiller/status
/1026258089799024640 [https://perma.cc/3W6Q-TES3].
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experienced social worker.391 Instead of appropriately managing and administering
social services, the state is engaged in a carceral-state practice of imposing criminal
justice responses to social welfare concerns. 392
B. Moral Sorting and Bias
An additional potentially troubling feature of opioid policing is that each of its
iterations leaves substantial room for what Erin Collins calls the “moral sorting”393
that characterizes other versions of criminal justice reform. Collins argues that
proponents of two new forms of “problem-solving” courts—veterans’ courts and
girls’ courts—invoke a “discourse of difference” to justify the creation of these new
courts.394 Proponents point to the putatively unique needs and experiences of
veterans and girls as justifying a different, more rehabilitative set of practices than
other defendants.395 The primary relevant common characteristic that members of
each of these groups is thought to share is significant trauma, which can be
criminogenic.396 As Collins points out, however, a history of trauma is something
that unites veterans and girls with, rather than distinguishing them from, other
offenders.397 What is at work in these “status courts,” Collins argues, is not that
veterans and girls uniquely experience trauma, but instead that their trauma simply
matters more than that of other defendants. 398 And the way in which it matters more
is that it entitles them to a more empathetic, relational court experience. 399 What the
architects of these status courts are engaging in is what Collins refers to as “moral
sorting.”400
An analysis of each of the two versions of opioid policing reveals a similar kind
of moral sorting. Recall that the aims of LEAD are to reduce the number of people
entering the criminal justice system for low-level offenses; to undo racial disparities;
as well as to make improvements in psychosocial, housing, and quality-of-life
outcomes for participants.401 The original Seattle program and those that have
emulated it recognize that arrests and prosecution do not help address underlying
problems that lead to criminal justice involvement for drug users, and that people of
color disproportionately are affected by Drug War tactics.402 The premise is that with
the services offered by LEAD case managers, drug users will be able to obtain a level

391. See Bell, supra note 126, at 2147–48.
392. See generally Akbar, supra note 44, at 410 (advocating “shrinking the large footprint
of policing, surveillance, and incarceration, and shifting resources into social programs in
Black communities: housing, health care, jobs, and schools”).
393. Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. 1481, 1500–07 (2017).
394. Id. at 1500.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 1502.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 1504.
400. Id. at 1505.
401. CLIFASEFI & COLLINS, supra note 287, at 4.
402. Beckett, supra note 29, at 87–89.
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of self-sufficiency that will keep them, long-term, from re-arrest.403 The eligibility
criteria revolve around ensuring that those admitted to the program are people who
truly deserve a different approach—meaning those whose criminal offending is
driven by addiction or mental illness rather than cold economic calculations or antisocial personalities.404
Yet, as with status courts, the moral sorting in opioid policing may not always
lead to evidence-based programming or equitable practices. LEAD presumptively
excludes from consideration individuals who have at any point been convicted of an
enumerated set of violent crimes, as well as those who, within a shorter period within
the past, have been convicted of less serious offenses.405 LEAD architects
presumably believe, as do many employers and landlords, that serious criminal
history is predictive of disruption or danger.406 However, there is considerable
evidence that the “most risky” offenders in fact make the best use of rehabilitative
interventions.407 Prioritizing participation of offenders with the highest need for
rehabilitative intervention would seem an appropriate course given LEAD’s goals.
That is, since the program aims to undo or at least minimize the racial disparities of
the War on Drugs, it ought not to rely so heavily on prior convictions as proxies for
program suitability. Prior convictions, after all, may indicate less about the person
than about the area in which she lives—and how heavily it is policed.408
A further problematic feature of LEAD design is the fact that one of the criteria
for eligibility is “amenability to diversion.”409 This phrase is nowhere defined. The
ambiguous question of whether a person is amenable to diversion is left to the
referring police officer.410 This conferral of discretion was deliberate and made
because “[s]takeholders . . . believe that officers possess deep knowledge about the
people they regularly encounter and are therefore best situated to determine if a
potential client is in a position to benefit from LEAD.” 411
Yet the capacious category of “amenability to diversion” leaves room for the
operation of a tremendous amount of bias—against people of color and against

403. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 304–08 and accompanying text.
405. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
406. See generally, DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA
OF MASS INCARCERATION 4 (2008) (noting increasing numbers of occupations, public services,
and social goods becoming off limits to ex-offenders).
407. MICHAEL REMPEL, CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION & BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
EVIDENCE-BASED STRATEGIES FOR WORKING WITH OFFENDERS (2014).
408. See generally Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of
Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 37 (1998) (concluding that because of disparities in
policing, “the existence or nonexistence of an arrest or conviction record may or may not
reflect relative criminality in black and white defendants”).
409. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
410. LAW ENF’T ASSISTED DIVERSION (LEAD), REFERRAL AND DIVERSION PROTOCOL JUNE
2015 2 (2015), http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/1185392/26595193/1444410613677
/June-2015-Seattle-LEAD-Referral-and-Diversion+Protocol.pdf?token=5WGzNMMvCro
bqqrnW8FTTOVJDf0%3D [https://perma.cc/XFB6-ZFFB]; Beckett, supra note 29, at 89
(noting that eligibility criteria are presumptive and not mandatory).
411. Beckett, supra note 29, at 89.
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people with mental illness, among other variables. 412 While initial evaluations seem
to suggest that the selection of individuals for inclusion has not been racially biased,
there are few mechanisms to ensure that this remains so. There is no obvious way to
promote accountability among the various stakeholders.413 The agreements are
contained only in memoranda of understanding and contain no provision for ensuring
they are followed.414 As with most internal policing decisions, there is no meaningful
legal accountability, either. Other than federal oversight through practice and pattern
lawsuits and individual civil rights lawsuits, there are few claims that can be raised
about any particular policing strategy. 415
The Angel Initiative’s design reflects and reinforces problematic notions of drug
users as inherently manipulative, thus similarly exemplifying moral sorting. The
requirement that drug users walk into the police precinct to ask for help exists in part
because of a popular conceptualization of drug addicts as inherently manipulative.416
Describing this walk-in requirement, a Connecticut sheriff opined that a hypothetical
patrol officer, upon encountering a motorist with heroin, was “not likely to believe a
driver’s claim that he or she was heading at that moment to the police department for
help.”417 Unlike LEAD, then, the Angel Initiative specifically excludes from its
services individuals for whom probable cause exists to arrest, except for the drugs
that they are intending to relinquish upon entering a precinct. In other words, it is not
enough that an individual expresses a desire for detoxification and other medical
treatment. If the officers believe that the user’s desire for treatment is expressed even
in part as a means of avoiding arrest, her request for a detoxification program will
likely be rejected.418
Even measured against its own questionable premises—that detoxification will
lead to abstinence, which will in turn reduce law-breaking behavior—the Angel
Initiative appears to come up short. Preliminary data analysis indicates that a total
of 81% of Angel Initiative participants had, at the time of admission, already received

412. See generally Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 987–91 (1999) (describing the effect of
stereotypic judgments and biases on police officers’ perceptions of whether an individual’s
behavior warrants police interaction). LEAD evaluation suggests that at least with respect to
race, the operation thus far has been unbiased.
413. See
LAW
ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTED
DIVERSION,
ABOUT
LEAD,
http://leadkingcounty.org/about (noting that participation of stakeholders is “entirely
voluntary”).
414. Id.
415. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109,
1169 (2017) (noting that “[e]ven the NYPD stop and frisk lawsuits—one of the most
prominent challenges to policing in recent memory—did not directly focus on the choice of
police tactics, but on the racially disparate impact of the practices”).
416. See, e.g., Barbara W. Lex, Narcotics Addicts’ Hustling Strategies: Creation and
Manipulation of Ambiguity, 18 J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 388 (1990).
417. Leavenworth, supra note 322.
418. Maia Szalavitz, Doctors Who Hate Drug Users Are Fueling the Opioid Crisis, VICE
(Nov. 22, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/43nzyq/doctors-who-hate
-drug-users-are-fueling-the-opioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/4A2K-8VN8] (“No one deserves
to be ‘treated like an addict,’ and it is outrageous that America’s medical and legal systems
have created a situation in which once addiction is suspected, compassion is eliminated.”).
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treatment for detoxification at least once—and 31% had more than six detoxification
attempts.419 Detoxification alone appears unlikely, then, to be sufficient to ensure
abstinence. Furthermore, most Angel Initiative participants do not gain access to
long-term treatment programs after they go through detox.420
The determination about who “deserves” a drug-treatment spot in a universe of
severely constrained supply is necessarily a subjective one. Yet it requires a level of
training, education, and experience that police likely lack. Law enforcement officers
cannot necessarily determine who really wants treatment—or who most deserves it.
Nor can they tell who can benefit most from the programming.
C. Distributive Inequities
Opioid policing implicates distributive equity issues.421 Consider the Angel
Initiative, which arranges priority detoxification spots for those who present
themselves to the police. 422 On the one hand, ensuring detox for people struggling
with drug dependency—and who may be at risk of overdose—seems a vast
improvement over other forms of officer engagement with people who are ill.423
Examples abound of law enforcement officers mistreating seriously mentally ill
people who are not properly medicated,424 including accounts of friends and family
of
mentally
ill
people
seeking
assistance
from
the
police
—only to have the encounter end with the mentally ill person arrested, tased, or
shot.425 Shepherding people with drug addiction through hospitalization and
detoxification suggests officers commendably acting as “guardians” rather than
“warriors,”426 in marked contrast with War on Drugs policing tactics.

419. Stephen P. Wood, Addiction Treatment Referral Through Local Police, 376 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 999, 999 (2017) (“A total of 81% of the participants had previously received
treatment for detoxification at least once, and 31% had more than six detoxification attempts
. . . [which] indicate[s] that the current method of detoxification is not effective.” Furthermore,
“[f]ew patients in the Angel Program received long-term counseling or treatment.”).
420. Schiff et al., supra note 288, at 46 (noting that the program was not able to overcome
a fragmented treatment system focused on acute episodic care which remains a barrier to longterm recovery).
421. Collins notes that status courts raise distributive equity issues as well. Collins, supra
note 393, at 1484 (“Examination of the justifications offered for status courts reveals new
insights about the distributive equity—or inequity—of the problem-solving court model itself.
The claim that the populations [sic] status courts target are [sic] unique does not withstand
scrutiny. And therein lies the danger of status courts: by invoking specious claims that the
needs of these populations are unique, status courts obscure the connections between status
court offenders and other offenders.”).
422. Schiff et al., supra note 288.
423. See, e.g., Camille A. Nelson, Frontlines: Policing at the Nexus of Race and Mental
Health, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 655–59 (2016) (describing the process by which mentally
ill people of color become “felonized” by the police).
424. Id.
425. Id. at 657.
426. See Stoughton, supra note 81, at 617.
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On the other hand, it is problematic to create a program that prioritizes scarce
treatment spots427 for people who feel comfortable walking into police precincts
carrying illicit drugs. Providers who participate in Angel Initiative networks have
already noted that the model is not sustainable on a long-term basis without
additional treatment beds.428 While the program does not deny assistance to anyone,
including people with criminal records, the fact remains that the mistrust between
police and low-income communities of color built up over generations and
exacerbated by the Drug War means that individuals from those communities have
well-founded reasons to be apprehensive about claims that officers only want to
help.429 The structure of the Angel Initiative necessarily privileges those individuals
who historically have been beneficiaries of the deployment of individual police
discretion not to arrest—namely, white people, and people without criminal records.
Further, immigrants in need of drug treatment are likely to be unwilling to access it
through approaching the police.430 As a result, while the engagement of officers with
medical providers is a salutary development, the structure of the Angel Initiative
recapitulates the racial and socioeconomic disparities of the War on Drugs.
If “opioid policing” is driven by the fact that the face of the opioid epidemic is
white, and middle-class, and that many users became addicted after initially having

427. The scarcity in treatment spots is unlikely to improve any time soon. See, e.g., Greg
Allen, Trump Says He Will Focus on Opioid Law Enforcement, Not Treatment, NPR (Feb. 7,
2018,
4:22
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health
-shots/2018/02/07/584059938/trump-says-he-will-focus-on-opioid-law-enforcement-not
-treatment [https://perma.cc/TQ3A-EC2T] (noting that the Trump Administration has
dramatically cut the budget of the federal National Drug Control Policy as well as the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration and has failed to ask Congress
for new spending for treatment).
428. John Keilman, Police Programs that Help Drug Users Get into Rehab Catching On,
CHI. TRIB. (July 23, 2017, 6:01 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local
/breaking/ct-safe-passages-police-heroin-met-20170723-story.html [https://perma.cc/54MV7BG4] (quoting the/a director of a drug treatment center participating in a Police Assisted
Addiction and Recovery Initiative (PAARI), the network of Angel Initiatives, as saying that
“the state’s treatment centers might be hard-pressed to keep up as the [PAARI] initiatives
continue to multiply”).
429. Nelson, supra note 423, at 674–75 (“Especially given the heightened racial tensions
in the United States following the killings of Trayvon Martin, Walter Scott, Eric Garner, Tamir
Rice, and Freddie Gray, it would not be surprising, nor unreasonable, for Black people to be
weary, or fearful, of interactions with police and security forces, which have been increasing
in the last several decades.”); see also Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the
Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 193 n. 128 (2002) (noting, in the context of
bus sweeps by police that lead to suspicionless searches by police with the passengers’
consent, that race, socioeconomic status, and prior personal contact with the police factor into
the likelihood that an individual will expect the police encounter to be hostile).
430. See, e.g., Rob Arthur, Latinos in Three Cities Are Reporting Fewer Crimes Since
Trump Took Office, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (May 18, 2017), https://fivethirtyeight.com
/features/latinos-report-fewer-crimes-in-three-cities-amid-fears-of-deportation
[https://
perma.cc/76ZH-B3ZY] (noting reports by police chiefs in Los Angeles and Houston that
Latinos are reporting fewer crimes, a fact that both chiefs blamed on heightened fear of
deportation among undocumented immigrants, a majority of whom are Latino).
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valid prescriptions,431 one must wonder whether the service-oriented response will
remain as the nature and scope of the epidemic changes. 432 As noted, heroin and
synthetic fentanyl are continuing to outpace prescription painkillers as the prime
source of addiction, overdose, and death. 433 Users of these drugs are increasingly
portrayed as the “junkies” we have been conditioned to respond to with something
other than compassion—with, to be precise, arrest, prosecution, and incarceration.434
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of two law enforcement innovations responding to the
opioid epidemic has engaged questions that have long preoccupied legal scholars of
how officers police, and to what end. Specifically, it has considered how police
departments that seek to institutionalize nonarrest responses to alleged drug
offenders define their goals—and whether they accomplish them. If local
stakeholders perceive that these efforts are reducing the incidence of overdose and
reducing crime, we might reasonably expect to see even more replication.
Yet replication attempts will confront practical and political obstacles. The first
and most obvious such obstacle is that each of the opioid policing programs relies on
an ability to access social services and drug treatment. LEAD participants make use
of Medicaid to access the different services they are offered.435 The cities
implementing LEAD are primarily in states that have expanded Medicaid, which is
critical to the program’s affordability.436 Where Medicaid is harder to obtain, so too

431. See Seelye, supra note 16.
432. David Rothman has noted the historical tendency of criminal justice innovations to
emerge that appear humane and rehabilitation oriented, only to become institutionalized and
ultimately stripped of their progressive intentions. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND
CONVENIENCE (1980).
433. See CDC, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, PROVISIONAL COUNTS OF DRUG
OVERDOSE DEATHS, AS OF 8/6/2017, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/health_policy/monthly
-drug-overdose-death-estimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/K3BS-V2KQ] (noting that in 2017,
drug overdose deaths in the United States involving synthetic opioids excluding methadone
totaled 20,145; deaths involving heroin totaled 15,446; and deaths involving natural and semisynthetic opioids totaled 14,427).
434. Acker, supra note 48.
435. See, e.g., Jamie Wood, An Innovative Drug Policy that Works, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND.
(Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/innovative-drug-policy
-works [https://perma.cc/B2WD-VAP3] (“[T]he Affordable Care Act and Medicaid expansion
mean that many services and costs that otherwise would have to be funded by state and local
governments are now covered by Medicaid” so “[l]ocal jurisdictions should make sure they
and their state is making the best possible use of this resource for the LEAD-eligible
population.”).
436. Camille Pendley, How Some Cities Are Helping Drug Offenders Instead of Arresting
Them, VICE (Dec. 2, 2015, 11:30 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gqmkmq/how
-some-american-cities-actually-help-drug-offenders-rather-than-arresting-them
[https://
perma.cc/L9EK-UU2T] (quoting former police chief of Albany, which runs a LEAD program,
explaining that having the insurance in place makes staying on medication for mental illness,
for instance, much easier, and the individual in turn is less likely to commit a crime related to
their illness).
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are services. Yet the demand for treatment far outpaces its availability, even for drug
users with Medicaid.437
Secondly, both LEAD and the Angel Initiative are heavily dependent on grants
from foundations and individuals.438 This fiscal situation is a microcosm of the fact
that, as public health and addiction experts note, the federal government has
committed but a fraction of the funding that is needed to address the widespread and
growing harms from opioid misuse.439 Instead, the current presidential administration
seems eager to re-up aspects of the War on Drugs.440 In addition, states across the
country are heightening criminal penalties for the sale and distribution of heroin,
fentanyl, carfentanil, and other controlled substances, in addition to passing druginduced homicide statutes.441 Prosecutions under drug-induced homicide laws have
increased by more than 300% in just six years, from 363 in 2011 to 1178 in 2016. 442
Praised by legislators and prosecutors as sending a strong message to dealers, druginduced homicide cases may instead create a chilling effect among drug users,
deterring them from calling 911 during an overdose.443 Of those who have witnessed
an overdose, more than half reported they are reluctant to dial 911, citing fear of legal
consequences.444 Rather than prosecuting upper-echelon drug distributors, these
cases often target friends and romantic partners of the overdose victim. 445
Even in the event of successful replication, the opioid policing approach does
nothing about the social and economic factors underlying the epidemic, and it may
in fact function to distract policymakers from addressing them. Opioids appear to be
exacerbating cumulative disadvantage for working-class people without a college
degree.446 In one small community besieged with opioid use, individuals “referenced

437. Vestal, supra note 242.
438. Flynn, supra note 365.
439. Lopez, supra note 138.
440. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att’y Gen., Office of the Att’y Gen., to all Federal
Prosecutors, Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 11, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download
[https://perma.cc/RA87
-5F9Z] (instructing prosecutors to abandon Obama-era polices regarding mandatory
minimums for nonviolent, low-level drug offenders and instead “charge and pursue the most
serious, readily provable offense”).
441. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
442. Zachary A. Siegel, Despite “Public Health” Messaging, Law Enforcement
Increasingly Prosecutes Overdoses as Homicides, APPEAL (Nov. 8, 2017), https://theappeal
.org/despite-public-health-messaging-law-enforcement-increasingly-prosecutes-overdoses
-as-homicides-84fb4ca7e9d7 [https://perma.cc/G6ZY-AGQD].
443. Id. (“Of those who have witnessed an overdose, more than half reported they are
reluctant to dial 911, citing fear of legal consequences.”).
444. Id. (citing a 2017 study published in the International Journal of Drug Policy).
445. Id. (citing Health in Justice, a policy institute out of Boston’s Northeastern School of
Law tracking punitive drug policies such as drug-induced homicide and involuntary
commitment for drug users. “Fewer than half of cases we analyzed involved a traditional
buyer/seller relationship,” said Leo Beletsky, lead investigator at Health In Justice, and an
Associate Professor of Law and Health Sciences at Northeastern University.”).
446. Case & Deaton, supra note 236. But see Malcolm Harris, The Death of the White
Working Class Has Been Greatly Exaggerated, PACIFIC STANDARD (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://psmag.com/news/the-death-of-the-white-working-class-has-been-greatly-exaggerated
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the hopelessness of the area and its lack of opportunity as driving the use of heroin,
with many explicitly suggesting the need for jobs and community reinvestment to
reduce fatalities.”447 One study found that overdose death rates correlate with lack of
social capital; scholars argue that this relationship likely exists through some
combination of mechanisms, such as the ability of social capital to prevent the drug
use, aid in recovery, and reduce the fatality rate of drug overdose. 448 While opioid
policing moves in welcome ways beyond the War on Drugs and the specialized drug
courts, ultimately policymakers must address these larger structural factors.
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that the study was published prior to being subject to peer review).
447. McLean, supra note 200, at 19.
448. Michael J. Zoorab & Jason L. Salemi, Bowling Alone, Dying Together: The Role of
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ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 1, 8 (2017).

